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Abstract 
In this thesis I defend giving drug addicted persons who are convicted of a crime 
the choice between an anti-drug vaccine and prison. My claim is that, should such a 
vaccine be developed, there would be no good moral reasons not to make such an 
offer. To support this claim I discuss and reject a series of objections to it. The 
objections are grouped in three different types; objections to paternalism, objections 
from theories of penal justice and objections from the rights of prisoners. Which 
objections are voiced depends largely on which view one takes of the nature of 
addiction. Hence, the objections are discussed both from a liberal and brain disease 
view of addiction. 
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Introduction 
 
“You can judge a society by how well it treats its prisoners”  
Fyodor Dostoevsky 
 
Imagine a near future, where drug addicts can be vaccinated against their drug 
dependence. A pill, injection, or a series of the like, and the drug that has dominated 
the existence of an addicted person loses its grip. The justice system comes to 
embrace this new treatment, and any addicted person, who is sentenced, is presented 
with the choice between serving the sentence or taking the vaccine for their particular 
drug addiction. 
To some this may sound like the first step into a brave new world, where everyone 
is to be vaccinated against anything unhealthy by a paternalist dictatorship. Soon, 
anyone caught by the long arm of the law for whatever reason from parking tickets 
up to more serious violations and are tested positive for drug use, will be subjected to 
vaccinations against drug use, paired with intense cognitive psychological treatment, 
turning them into ideal, law-abiding citizens. To others, this scenario may seem like 
paradise for drug-fiends and hardened criminals, who see a way to avoid prison by 
claiming to be addicted. Besides, vaccinating against drug addiction will only serve 
as a cheap excuse for the government to avoid doing anything about the real causes 
of drug addiction, which are deplorable social, psychological, and economic 
conditions for large parts of the population. People will get a shot in the arm, and get 
kicked back in the gutter. And it will not stop here. Soon any deviating behavior or 
thoughts will be corrected pharmacologically for the common good. Human rights 
such as the right to bodily integrity, the right to informed consent and the right to 
freedom of thought are eroded by the wave of coerced treatments that will be set in 
motion by the coerced use of an anti-drug vaccine.  
These intuitions about why such an anti-drug vaccine should have no place in the 
justice system are all crude versions of a few of the objections that will be discussed 
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in this thesis. In spite of these apprehensions, the claim that will be defended here is 
that an anti-vaccination program for convicted addicts is morally defensible. The 
background for this lies in a scenario which is all too prevalent in our time: 
“Problem drug users1 number about 27 million, which is 0.6 per cent of the 
world adult population. Throughout the world, illicit drug use appears to be 
generally stable, though it continues to rise in several developing countries. 
Heroin, cocaine and other drugs kill around 0.2 million people each year, 
shattering families and bringing misery to thousands of other people. Illicit 
drugs undermine economic and social development and contribute to crime, 
instability, insecurity and the spread of HIV." (UNODC 2012 p.1)  
Approximately half of the drug-related death cases involve fatal overdoses. The rest 
are divided between drug-induced accidents, suicide or medical conditions associated 
with or exacerbated by illicit drugs. (UNODC 2012 p.79) 
A conservative estimate is that 7000 people died of overdoses or other drug-
induced causes in the EU-membership countries and Norway in 2010. (EMCDDA 
2012 p.86). This amounts to almost 4% of all deaths in Europe in the age group of 
15-39 years. Add to this the 10% of the overall burden of disease in Europe that is 
connected to substance use disorders and drug addiction. (Carter & Hall 2012 p.23) 
Drug abuse carries with it personal, social and economic costs: "Abuse of and 
addiction to alcohol, nicotine, and illegal substances cost Americans upwards of half 
a trillion dollars a year (the combined medical, economic, criminal, and social 
impact). Every year, the abuse of illicit drugs and alcohol contributes to the death of 
more than 100,000 Americans, while tobacco is linked to an estimated 440,000 
deaths per year." (NIDA 2012) 
All these figures should serve to confirm the fact that drug addiction is a huge 
problem that ruins and ends the lives of many of our fellow citizens and imposes 
                                                            
1 By the term 'problem drug users' is meant people who: "... use drugs in a manner that exposes 
them to very severe health problems" (UNODC 2012 p.69) 
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great costs to societies worldwide, economically, as well as in terms of loss of 
welfare.  
The reaction from the world’s governments during the course of the 20th century 
has primarily been to make most addictive drugs illegal, with the exception of 
alcohol and nicotine. This illegality has not surprisingly lead to an increased risk of 
imprisonment for drug addicts and with it a large concentration of addicts in prisons. 
(EMCDDA 2012 p.1) 
According to a review of international studies, 10–48 % of men and 30–60 % of 
women were dependent on or used illicit drugs in the month before entering prison. 
(EMCDDA 2012 p.8) Although the data are not completely comparable, the figures 
do point in the same direction for all developed countries. A survey of State and 
Federal prisoners in the US estimated that about half of the prisoners met Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM) criteria for drug abuse or 
dependence. (NIDA 2012 p.8) One-third of prisoners in European prisons show 
problematic drug use patterns. In Canada, 70% of prisoners are diagnosed as having 
a substance abuse problem (this includes alcohol problems). (EMCDDA 2012 p.10) 
Zooming in on the so-called hard illicit drugs (cocaine, heroin and 
amphetamines), the picture remains the same. Cocaine is, after marijuana, Europe's 
second most common illicit drug reported, with a lifetime prevalence of 0.3-10% 
among the general population. Amongst prisoners the prevalence is 6-53%. 
(EMCCDA 2012) Less than 1% of the general European population has ever used 
heroin; for prisoners the number varies between 15 to 39% in the European countries 
that can provide these statistics. Outside of Europe, 34% of Canadian drug offenders 
in prison and 55% of Australian prison entrants report that they have injected a drug 
(EMCDDA 2012). 
That the prison system is full of addicts is perhaps not surprising, some might 
even say that that is the point of making drugs illegal, protecting society by keeping 
addicts of the street. This may be true, but the problems do not end here. 
First, keeping people incarcerated is very expensive, and it is of serious human 
costs to the persons involved. Second, there is evidence that it does little to deter 
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addicts from committing new crimes, making the costs of incarceration rise again. 
(UNODC 2009 p.4-5) Third, prisons breed criminals:  
"In fact, incarceration in prison and confinement in compulsory drug 
treatment centres often worsens the already problematic lives of drug users and 
drug dependent individuals, particularly the youngest and most vulnerable. 
Exposure to the prison environment facilitates affiliation with older criminals 
and criminal gangs and organizations. It also increases stigma and helps to 
form a criminal identity. It often increases social exclusion, worsens health 
conditions and reduces social skills." (UNODC 2010 p.3) 
Having established that the problems of drug addiction are indeed very real, and that 
in few, if any places in our society, are the problems greater than among the part of 
the population convicted of a crime. So, why not start there? Prisons are full of 
addicts; to some degree they breed addiction, and drug use in prison alone is in itself 
a large problem. Add to this that, for many of the drug users that end up in prison, it 
is a unique or rare chance to get them in contact with drug treatment services. 
(EMCDDA 2012 p.12) "A persistent problem in treating addiction is attracting 
addicted individuals into effective treatment and keeping them there long enough to 
benefit from the encounter." (Carter & Hall 2012 p.134) Once tried and convicted, 
they are within reach more than they ever will be. 
What should be drawn from all these facts and figures is that the problem of drug 
addiction is serious, causing suffering and death to a large minority of the world’s 
population, and is costing societies vast sums every year. Incarceration, the most 
common societal reaction, is not preventing or even reducing the problem, it is in 
fact adding to it. This is the background on which the claim of this thesis is made, 
that it would be morally defensible to present addicted offenders with the choice of 
an anti-drug vaccine as an alternative to some of or their whole sentence. 
That drug-abuse is a problem is not much of a surprise to anyone. Even so, we 
should be wary of inflated rhetoric aimed at focusing our attention on one solution to 
one of society's many problems, especially if this allows other problems to grow in 
the shade of that attention. For any treatment has side effects, be it personal and 
societal. The in question here can be said to challenge the rights to refuse treatment, 
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the rights of prisoners, and even justice itself. Hence, it is important to carefully 
examine the objections to offering an anti-drug vaccine under coercive 
circumstances. The next section will provide a detailed description of the use of an 
anti-drug vaccine that this thesis will propose. 
 
The anti-drug vaccine 
This thesis aims to defend the following proposal:  
Should the technology become available, criminally convicted persons who 
are sufficiently addicted to a hard illicit drug should be given the choice of an 
anti-drug vaccine to replace all or part of their prison sentence. 
 
This proposal obviously raises more than a few immediate questions. These will be 
dealt with in the following order: First, by giving some clarifying remarks on the 
content and possible reality of this offer, and second, by listing a series of 
assumptions intended as a list minimal requirements that such an anti-drug vaccine 
must live up to, in order to qualify being used in this type of offer.   
The first issue to be addressed is what type of treatment is in question here. It will 
be a 'vaccine-like treatment'. This term is deliberately coined to be vague enough to 
be open to new inventions of neuropharmacology, while still describing the basic 
properties that makes it useful. The term 'anti-drug vaccine' will refer to this 
treatment from this point forward. The properties of the anti-drug vaccine must be as 
follows: First, that the vaccine somehow prevents the effect of the addictive drug on 
the addict, or that it removes the desire for the drug, so the addict has no incentive to 
take the drug. Secondly, that the treatment can be administered in doses that are quite 
far apart in time, similar to regular vaccines. It is important both for reasons of addict 
autonomy and cost-efficiency that the treatment is administered on something like a 
monthly or yearly basis, instead of several daily doses, as is the case with present 
substitution drugs such as methadone. (Carter & Hall 2012) 
The next issue raised is whether this type of anti-drug vaccine is a piece of 
science-fiction, which will never materialize outside heads of philosophers and other 
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dreamers? Making accurate predictions of the future is outside the scope of this 
thesis. However, these types of medicines are being developed. In fact, vaccines have 
already been developed against a variety of drugs, such as opioids, nicotine, cocaine, 
methamphetamine and phencyclidine (PCP). (Carter & Hall 2012) Several cocaine 
vaccines have reached phase 2 clinical trials, but none have proved to be effective on 
more than one third of the test subjects. This work of developing new vaccines is 
continuing. (Carter & Hall 2012) There are several ways in which an anti-drug 
vaccine could work: 
"Recent attention has been directed to developing a means of inactivating 
the drug before it can gain access to the central nervous system. These vaccines 
are designed to block or significantly reduce the effects of certain drugs on the 
brain by inducing antibody formation, producing an effect similar to 
vaccination against infectious disease. Removing the 'high' may reduce the 
craving for the drug. Furthermore, vaccination may stop a person from 
becoming addicted in the first place by removing the incentive to take the 
drug." (Ashcroft et al. 2006 p.441) 
Some drugs are already being used in this way. Naltrexone, an opioid antagonist is 
being used to treat opioid addiction in some American states’ drug courts. Naltrexone 
is not a vaccine but a form of replacement drug, that can be ingested via implants in 
the skin for slow release over up to three months, and has already proved to be an 
effective opioid antagonist. (Caplan 2006) 
The reason for focusing on the potential use of an anti-drug vaccine and not 
limiting the discussion to the coerced use of existing drugs, is that if a vaccine is as 
effective as it is assumed here, it will be relevant to use it on a much wider scale than 
is possible with the present alternatives. The fact that it will only have to be 
administered a few times a year will reduce the costs to both the criminal justice 
system and the convicted criminals, making it a much more attractive alternative to 
other forms of punishment. Also, a treatment which works over a longer period of 
time can also have more wide-reaching impact on the autonomy of the person treated 
coercively, since she cannot opt out of it until it stops working. Even so, many of the 
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arguments put forth in this thesis could also apply to the present discussion of the 
coerced use of drugs such as naltrexone and methadone. 
Also, even though an anti-drug vaccine is not going to hit the market next year,  
at the same time it is not simply science-fiction. Although it is still a ways into the 
future, now is the time for some hard thinking about the implications surrounding the 
introduction of such a vaccine. (Cohen 1997) 
The use of legal coercion to urge addicted offenders to enter treatment is not new. 
It has been used in the US for 60 years, and is used today many countries worldwide; 
Australia, UK and Portugal to name a few. (Hall 1997, Seddon 2007, Tännsjö 1999) 
The proposal of an anti-drug vaccine begs the question: How addicted should a 
prisoner be in order to be ‘sufficiently addicted to be in need of treatment’? As we 
shall see, the nature of addiction is highly controversial from a medical and a 
neurological point of view. However, from a behavioral one, there is some consensus 
that the cardinal feature of addiction is compulsive drug use despite significant 
negative consequences. (American Psychiatric Association 1994 in Hyman 2007) 
Compulsive is to be understood here as perceived compulsion. (See also the 
definition of addiction later in this section) Acknowledging that addiction varies in 
degrees, exactly where and how the line should be drawn as to when a person is 
'sufficiently' addicted to be given the offer, will have to be left to medical personnel 
with the relevant training and experience to decide. 
What is meant by 'hard illicit drugs' is heroin, cocaine and amphetamines and 
similar substances. The reason for focusing on these is that they are in each their own 
way a) highly addictive b) very harmful and c) illegal. As will be explored further, 
these properties make the reasons for coercing addicts to stay off these drugs 
especially pressing. 
The question of how long the addict in question is to be under the influence of the 
vaccination is a question of what is possible medically, effective from a treatment 
view, and fair from a legal perspective. 
The pivotal point in deciding which convicted persons get to choose a vaccine is 
the drug addiction, not the crime, hence the crimes for which the offer can be made 
do not have to be directly drug related. Getting convicted on drug charges such as 
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possession and sale is of course not the only way for addicted persons to enter the 
prison system. The connection between drug use and crime is much more 
multifaceted. "Illicit drug use is also closely linked to crime, in various ways. Drug 
users often resort to acquisitive crime to finance their habit. Additionally, many 
criminals are under the influence of illicit drugs, which reduce inhibitions, when 
committing crime. Illicit drug use is frequently associated with behavioral problems, 
which, depending on the substance and the amounts used, may include or result in 
aggression or violence." (UNODC 2012 p.6) Based on these observations, I propose 
that the offer should be given to all offenders that are sufficiently addicted, or a far 
too large of a group will not be treated. 
Assumptions 
When referring to the anti-drug vaccine in this thesis it will be assumed that some 
key features concerning it are as follows: 
1. The offer will be given by the court after conviction as part of the sentencing. 
Also: "The legal process of treatment as an alternative to criminal justice sanctions is 
consistent with the constitution and laws of the country, including those that protect 
the civil liberties of the patient." (UNODC 2009 p.6) 
2. The eligibility of the convicted person, the assessment and the administration of 
the treatment will be performed or monitored by medical personnel with the 
appropriate training. The treatment will be given in a way which accords with normal 
healthcare practices. 
3. The drug user is free to leave the treatment program and take her prison term 
instead. Of course, in practice once a dose of a vaccine is given, its effect doesn’t 
wear off until some months later.  
4. "Treatment is informed by scientific evidence-based clinical guidelines. Where 
evidence is lacking, new approaches are rigorously evaluated." (UNODC 2009 p.6) 
5. The convicted persons are informed about the risks and benefits of the 
treatment. 
6. Treatment is paid for by the criminal justice system.  
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This section has described the background on which the coerced offer of an anti-
drug vaccine treatment is to be provided. Next, I turn to clarifying some key terms 
used in the discussion of this offer. 
 
Addiction 
This section will provide a working definition of addiction. As will be shown in the 
section dealing with the paternalistic objections to addiction treatment, a 
neuroscientific definition of addiction is highly controversial. Thus, the introduction 
will be limited to a behavioral definition, and description of the term which is a lot 
less controversial. This thesis uses the definition used by NIDA and DSM. NIDA is 
USA's National Institute on Drug Abuse. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) is a diagnostic manual used by clinicians, which contains 
descriptions and symptoms of all mental disorders classified by the American 
Psychiatric Association. The DSM term ’dependence’ is what NIDA refers to as 
‘addiction’ in this thesis addiction and dependence will be used interchangeably. 
NIDA defines the behavioral aspects of dependence (addiction) as follows: "The 
term dependence includes such symptoms as: drug taking in larger amounts than 
intended; inability to cut down on drug use; a great deal of time spent in activities 
necessary to obtain the drug; and continued use despite knowledge of health or social 
problems caused by the drug. Dependence may or may not include "physical 
dependence," defined by withdrawal symptoms when drug use is abruptly ceased, 
and "tolerance," the need for more drug to achieve a desired effect." (NIDA 2012) 
It should be noted that while there are other things people might get addicted to, 
gambling, sugar, shopping or sex to name a few, this thesis will deal solely with drug 
addiction. When the words addiction or dependence are used, what is meant is drug 
addiction unless otherwise indicated. 
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Coercion 
This section will provide a working definition of coercion. One of the problems in 
assessing the effects and implications of coerced treatment is that the term is often 
not defined properly. (Miller & Flaherty 2000) Thus, a definition and a brief 
qualification of the term, regarding the use of it in this thesis, is in order. 
A dictionary definition reads: "[c]oerce: make somebody do something by using 
threats or force." (Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary) 
In this thesis, coercion is not mandating or compulsion, which in the context of 
this thesis would be simply forcing the convicted addicts to undergo treatment. In the 
modern philosophical sense of the word, coercion takes up a middle position between 
mandating and free choice. Coercion is more like the infamous 'offer you (almost) 
cannot refuse'. It is a choice influenced by some form of threat of force.  
First, there are many forms of coercion. The different kinds of coercion that are 
usually exerted on addicts to fight their addiction can be; legal; by the justice system, 
formal; typically by employers, and informal; such as threats, ultimatums and 
interventions by friends and family members and the like. (Wild et al. 2012) This 
paper will focus solely on the first, coercion by the justice system. 
Robert Nozick, who can be said to have fathered the modern discussion of the 
term, in his 1969 article ‘Coercion’ sets up a list of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for judging whether coercion takes place. (Anderson 2011) In a version 
simplified by Scott Anderson, it argues that P coerces Q if and only if: 
"1. P aims to keep Q from choosing to perform action A; 
2. P communicates a claim to Q; 
3. P's claim indicates that if Q performs A, then P will bring about some 
consequence that would make Q's A-ing less desirable to Q than Q's not A-ing; 
4. P's claim is credible to Q; 
5. Q does not do A; 
6. Part of Q's reason for not doing A is to lessen the likelihood that P will bring 
about the consequence announced in (3)." (Anderson 2009) 
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Rewriting the list of conditions to fit the discussion at hand would read: 
1. The justice system aims to get a convicted addict to take an anti-drug vaccine; 
2. The justice system communicates the claim that it wants the addict to take 
the anti-drug vaccine; 
3. The justice system's claim indicates that if that addict does not take the 
vaccine, then the justice system will make the convicted addict serve the entire 
term of punishment that she has been sentenced, making not taking the vaccine 
less desirable to the addict; 
4. The justice systems claim is credible to the addict (or it would be a very poor 
justice system); 
5. The addict takes the vaccine; 
6. Part of the addict's reason for taking the vaccine is the likelihood of not 
having to serve the full sentence. 
Thus, the offer proposed in this thesis seems to more or less follow the same 
structure and does fulfill Nozick’s original conditions. However, some theorists 
claim that only threats can be said to be properly coercive, whereas offers cannot. 
(Anderson 2011) The reason for this is in part a technical discussion about the 
difference between the nature of offers and threats. One part of this discussion is 
relevant to the proposal made here, namely that of whether an offer (or a threat) is 
coercive, if not accepting (or complying with) it does not make the person worse off. 
Recall that the offer made here does not include adding to the sentence of the subject 
should she decide not to take the drug-vaccination. In such a case, the subject would 
simply be made to serve the term originally sentenced, and thus is not worse off 
because of the offer. According to some definitions of coercion, it is crucial that the 
coercee is worse off if she does not comply to or accept the offer. (Anderson 2011) If 
the used definition of coercion hinges upon the conditions of the coercee in this 
sense, then the offer made in this thesis is not a coercive one. 
The reason why the offer can still be considered coercive is that it relies on a 
different understanding of coercion, where the focus is on the relation of power 
between the coercer and the coercee. In particular where this balance can be used by 
the coercer to make the coercee do what is required. Scott Anderson dubs this the 
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‘enforcement approach’ which he defines ad follows: "Anderson requires that the 
coercer engages in activity either to create a power differential between himself and 
the coercee (say, by taking up arms), or else draw upon some existing differential 
between agents of the sorts to which coercer and coercee belong (say, policeman and 
citizen, respectively). This “enforcement approach” suggests that uses of these sorts 
of powers are distinctive, and thus can be used to pick out long-standing threats (such 
as the criminal law) as coercive." (Anderson 2011)  
In other words, the offer of treatment proposed in this thesis is coercive because 
of the powerful position that the offerer takes in relation to the person receiving the 
offer. Facing criminal punishment, the convicted addict is in a very weak position in 
relation to the criminal justice system. As a result of this uneven power-relation, an 
offer of this kind and the convicted person's reaction to it is inherently influenced by 
the justice system's ability, and law-given authority, to exert force on the individual 
in question, making the choice to accept the offer is not only a constrained but a 
coerced one. To put it bluntly, it is the power of the justice system to put the person 
in prison, which also makes it possible to make such an offer. Without the possibility 
of being punished, the offer would be just another voluntary treatment possibility. 
Notice here that the question of guilt is ignored, it is assumed that the addict has 
brought the situation on herself, but that does not enter into the question of whether 
the choice is coercive or not. 
 
Addiction neuroethics 
A miracle cure against drug addiction is not right around the corner, and it is still 
controversial among scientists whether it ever will be. (Carter & Hall 2009) 
However, in the past decade, neuroscience has made much progress in the 
understanding of how addiction works, and in exploring different ways of treating 
addiction, among the possibilities are an anti-drug vaccine, as described earlier. 
Thus, the possible implications of this new neurological knowledge needs to be 
considered now, before it leaves the lab and enters our lives. It is indeed worth 
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exploring the ethical implications of neuropharmacological or other neuroscientific 
addiction treatments.  
The field for developing this understanding of the ethical questions concerning the 
neuroscience of addiction has been named addiction neuroethics. A central point of 
this branch of neuroethics is to consider the ethical issues which neuroscientific 
discoveries of how human drug addiction foster. It is a branch of ethics, because it is 
concerned with working out the morally correct action by exploring the arguments 
for or against a certain application of the neuroscientific knowledge. (Carter & Hall 
p.85)  
This thesis is written with one leg in this particular branch of applied ethics. Its 
aim is to consider whether a certain proposal, described in the introduction is morally 
defensible. This is done by analyzing various objections and counter-objections to 
the claim that giving convicted drug addicts the choice of an anti-drug vaccine to 
replace part of or their entire sentence. In doing this, the other leg touches down into 
criminal justice ethics and healthcare ethics.  
Discussing the ethical implications of novel and even future technologies is 
important, but it is of course never the whole story of a complicated and 
heterogeneous area such as that of treatment for addiction. Whilst convinced that the 
ethical discussion in this thesis can contribute pieces to the puzzle, it is also clear that 
it is not laid only using sound moral arguments, the problem of addiction can only be 
properly addressed by a multi-faceted approach from both the practical and the 
theoretical sides. 
"If neuroscience research on addiction is to be translated into effective 
public health policies it is critical that we understand the ethical, philosophical 
and social contexts within which neuroscience research is conducted, 
understood and applied."(Carter & Hall 2012 p.4)  
This thesis is a humble attempt at a contribution to the ethical side of this. 
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The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into three major parts. In the first part of this, I will attempt to 
defend the offer of an anti-drug vaccine for paternalistic reasons. The basic claim is 
that the vaccine could be offered for the good of the addicted person receiving it. In 
the second part, the focus shifts to the public good, where a number of penal-
theoretical objections are considered. The basic claim here is that an anti-drug 
vaccine offer can accord with the reasons we normally hold for punishing, whether 
they be consequentialist or retributivist. The third part focuses both on the good of 
society as a whole and on the individual, in that a number of objections are 
considered which all pertain to prisoners’ rights, and whether the anti-drug vaccine 
violates such rights in an unacceptable way in order to gain positive consequences 
for society as a whole. Lastly, two of the central non-moral objections are briefly 
mentioned.  
Through the entire thesis, incarceration will serve as a baseline for the discussion 
in that it is the most commonly used punishment in most societies. Since the anti-
drug vaccine is proposed as an alternative to incarceration, it will be assumed that 
incarceration is a morally accepted form of punishment of criminal offenders. 
Whether this is in fact so, is not within the scope of this thesis. If the drug-
vaccination can be shown to be morally as good as, or better than incarceration, then 
my claim is that it follows that it would be morally acceptable to use it as a means in 
the criminal justice system. Thus, some objections will be discarded because they 
also apply to incarceration. 
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Part 1: For the good of the addicts 
Objections to paternalistic reasons for coerced use of an 
anti-drug vaccine 
One type of reason for presenting convicted criminals with a coerced choice of an 
anti-drug vaccine is that the treatment will serve the good of the addicts themselves. 
The claim I want to defend in part one is that the suffering that serious addictions 
exert on the addicted individuals (especially while serving in a prison), makes 
coerced treatment of the kind presented in the introduction morally acceptable for the 
good of the addicts. The sufferings include the social stigmatization, economic ruin, 
and mental and physical illnesses that often accompany the lives of heavily addicted 
persons. Providing a chance of achieving a decent level of welfare seems a good 
reason to coerce someone into treatment, when the alternative is locking them up. 
The price that is paid for this is a partial infringement of their autonomy, by having 
to make choice under coercive circumstances. One might say that coercive treatment 
of addicts for their own good raises the question of the respect for personal autonomy 
versus the principles of beneficence. (Carter & Hall 2012)  
All coercive measures have consequences for the rights of autonomous persons. 
(Tännsjö 1999) The question is whether we should be prepared to accept them to 
gain the beneficial effects of the treatment for the addict's sake. This part of the thesis 
will argue that we should (in the case of the anti-drug vaccine as presented in the 
introduction), by presenting and discussing a number of objections and counter-
objections to this practice.  
Before the objections can be presented, some pages will be spent on clarifying the 
concepts of paternalism and personal autonomy. The following section will present 
different two views of addiction. Any debate over of paternalistic treatment of 
addiction must invariably also consider the discussion over the nature of addiction 
and its implications for addict autonomy. The purpose of the sections on 'the brain 
disease model' and 'the liberal account of addiction’ is not to settle this discussion, 
but rather to describe it in short form. This is necessary, because the reasons for 
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accepting or rejecting coerced treatment using an anti-drug vaccine vary greatly 
depending on which view of addiction is taken. 
The following section will present a difference between two types of paternalism, 
which is central to the discussion of coerced treatment for beneficent reasons. 
 
Paternalism: hard and soft 
Paternalism is acting against the will of a person for her own good. "Paternalism is 
the interference of a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and 
defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be better off or 
protected from harm." (Dworkin 2010) 
 In the case suggested in this thesis, the justice system interferes with the 
convicted person's rights by presenting the convicted addict with choice that is very 
hard to refuse: take the anti-drug vaccine or be put in prison. The addicted person 
may not want this, but the offer is made using the manipulative circumstances of the 
pending prison sentence to coerce her into making a choice that will be beneficial. 
This is paternalism. However, paternalism can be distinguished into many 
subdivisions. (Dworkin 2010) In the case of coerced addiction treatment, the 
important division is between hard and soft paternalism. (Carter & Hall 2012) Soft 
paternalism applies in cases where “[t]reatment is provided on beneficent grounds, in 
order to prevent substantially non-voluntary or non-autonomous harm.” (Carter & 
Hall 2012, p. 138) If on the other hand the state acts beneficently against the will of a 
person who is acting voluntarily and knowledgeably, it is a case of hard paternalism. 
In other words, the important divide lies between those persons who are deemed 
competent and thus capable of making autonomous choices, and those who are not 
fully autonomous. The reason this divide is important, is that if a person is not fully 
autonomous, making decisions for them is considered less coercive, than if the 
person is fully autonomous. (Feinberg 1971)  
Other cases of persons who are not considered completely autonomous and for 
whom others must make beneficent decisions range from children who do not want 
to brush their teeth, to committing people suffering from serious mental illness to 
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closed institutions. Examples of hard paternalism are mandated use of seatbelts and 
motorcycle helmets, legally proscribed insurances and mandating parents to educate 
their children. 
Since the divide between hard and soft paternalism is central to the discussion on 
whether an anti-drug vaccine can be given for paternalistic reasons; and personal 
autonomy is central in deciding if a coercive measure is a case of hard or soft 
paternalism; a brief qualification of autonomy is in order. 
 
Personal autonomy 
If paternalism is acting against a person's free will, it can be said that her personal 
autonomy is being violated. What the concept of personal autonomy exactly includes 
is controversial. (Buss 2008) It is of course not within the scope of this section to 
settle the debate, but to provide a working definition to use in the following 
discussion of how addiction affects personal autonomy. To begin with, when 
autonomy is mentioned in the following, what is meant is personal autonomy. In 
many definitions of personal autonomy, conflict arises because someone is restricting 
someone else's right to self-government. When it comes to addiction this is not the 
case. Rather, autonomy is threatened from within: 
"To be autonomous is to be a law to oneself; autonomous agents are self-
governing agents. Most of us want to be autonomous because we want to be 
accountable for what we do, and because it seems that if we are not the ones 
calling the shots, then we cannot be accountable. More importantly, perhaps, 
the value of autonomy is tied to the value of self-integration. We don't want to 
be alien to, or at war with, ourselves; and it seems that when our intentions are 
not under our own control, we suffer from self-alienation." (Buss 2008)  
When addiction is described as impairing autonomy, what is meant is this lack of 
self-integration and control, which is experienced as lack of self-government.  
Here, autonomy is also understood as coming in degrees. It is not an all-or-
nothing phenomenon. In some sense we all have our autonomy limited by living 
among other people, the social and physical world, and our own shortcomings. A 
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completely autonomous being is a god-like creature, which does not suffer the 
normal constraints that we earthlings do. (Levy 2012) Yet, we do not normally think 
of ourselves as having our autonomy diminished by having to go to work or having 
one too many beers. This is because we can quit if we want to. Normally, loss of 
autonomy requires that someone takes our autonomy away from us. But with 
addiction it is the addiction itself which compromises self-government. (Levy 2012) 
This is not the same as claiming that addiction is in some way understood to have 
some sort of agency: 
"Rather, if addiction involves a loss of autonomy it must somehow undercut 
the addict’s own ability to pursue her goals. Addicts, it is suggested here, have 
compromised self-government even though they are not under the strict rule of 
anyone else." (Levy 2006 p.141) 
This and the preceding section have shown that the difference between hard and soft 
paternalism is important when considering the moral viability of coerced treatment, 
and that these concepts hinge on whether the person in question can be considered 
fully autonomous. The following sections will show how different views of addiction 
differ greatly in their view of addict autonomy, and hence whether coerced treatment 
is hard or soft paternalism. 
 
Diseased or desirous: different accounts of addiction 
The question of personal autonomy is central to the discussion of treatment for 
addiction and coerced treatment in particular. Roughly speaking, the debate unfolds 
between two different interpretations of the neuroscience and behavioral science of 
addiction. One interprets the scientific results as showing that addiction is a disease 
of the brain which impairs the autonomy of addicts, the so-called 'brain disease 
model'. The other side interprets the same science as showing that addicts are 
autonomous individuals that choose to perform irrational behavior, and that which 
takes place in the neural connectors in the brains of addicts is not in so different in 
nature from what takes place in 'normal' human brains. This is the 'liberal view’. The 
liberal view is not to be confused with the 'lay' or 'moral view' of addiction, which 
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does not acknowledge that addiction is a disease, but also adds a moral judgment on  
to addiction; that addicts are behaving morally wrong by pursuing their addiction. 
The brain disease view and the liberal view and variants of them, are predominant 
in the modern scientific literature (Carter & Hall 2012) and they are the two which 
this thesis will proceed with, after a short description of the lay or moral view. 
 
The moral view of addiction 
The debate over the nature of addiction goes back at least 200 years (Foddy and 
Savulescu 2010, Jay 2010) and there are and have been other views of addiction than 
the two that will be contrasted in the later discussion. The so-called moral view was 
predominant even in scientific circles before the advance of modern neuroscience 
and cognitive science, and is still popular in lay circles. (Foddy & Savulescu 2010) 
This is also referred to as the “lay view” (Foddy & Savulescu 2006 p.2 ) or the “folk 
understanding.” (Carter & Hall 2012 p.21) It holds that addiction is a wrong that 
people bring onto themselves, because they are antisocial hedonists that choose to 
take drugs, instead of living up to their responsibilities as citizens, workers, parents, 
friends etc. What should be done about them, is that they should get their act together 
and quit, or be punished severely. One effect of this view is expressed by Adrian 
Carter and Wayne Hall: 
"For example, an unsympathetic view is often held towards addicted persons 
from a lower socio-economic background whose addiction causes significant 
harm to others, particularly children or dependents."(Carter & Hall 2012 p.21)  
In the scientific literature, the moral view has little significance, thus and for 
reasons of brevity it will only be mentioned occasionally in this thesis.    
Next is a short introduction to the position currently held by the medical 
consensus on addiction and a discussion on its position regarding coerced treatment. 
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 The brain disease view 
“[I]n effect, addiction first hijacks the reward system below decks, then commits 
mutiny on the bridge by sabotaging the cognitive systems that would otherwise check 
its influence.” (Ross et al. 2008) 
 
The modern clinical view of addiction is that it is a disease of the brain, and addicts 
should be treated as patients that suffer from a disease called drug addiction. 
"Addiction is a chronic, relapsing brain disease." (Carter & Hall 2012 p.32 and 
NIDA 2012 p.1) This view of addiction as disease, referred to as 'the brain disease 
view', dominates the major clinical diagnostic criteria for substance dependence or 
addiction. (Carter & Hall 2012) "The chronic disease model claims that addiction is a 
result of abnormal brain tissue in the same way that cardiovascular disease is a result 
of abnormal heart tissue."(Carter & Hall 2012 p.32) This disease impairs the addicts’ 
autonomy by making them more or less unable to refrain from taking drugs. The 
administration of addictive drugs causes lasting changes in the brain's 
neurotransmitter system causing addicts to have relapses even after long periods of 
abstinence. This neurophysiological explanation for addiction is based on 
neuroimaging studies, which reveal changes caused by drug use in the cognitive 
processes of salience, motivation, memory and conditioned learning, and inhibitory 
control. (Carter & Hall 2012) 
In short, the brain disease model for addiction claims that addiction occurs 
because addictive drugs work by "hijacking" the brain's reward system. (Charland 
2002 p.43) The reward system is at the center of all human learning. By releasing 
natural dopamine in the brain that creates a pleasurable sensation, it tells us that the 
food we eat is good for us, or that any experience is better than expected. Dopamine 
is a "learning signal." (Hyman 2007 p.10) When we get it right, we get dopamine, 
and dopamine feels good. After having received the dopamine a number of times, the 
neural pathways in the brain are changed. This makes us remember the action in 
question as something which causes pleasure, and thus is worth repeating. 
21 
 
The problem occurs when actions that are not healthy also feel good. All addictive 
drugs in some way affect the dopamine system in the brain, causing a pleasurable 
sensation and teaching the reward system that taking this drug is good, even though it 
may in fact be harmful. The problem with addictive drugs is that they always signal 
that the experience is better than expected. (Hyman 2007) This causes the brain to 
'overlearn', which again causes the addict to place an exaggerated value to drugs over 
other activities. This is the mechanism that makes the temptation to take drugs so 
strong that some proponents of the brain disease model call it compulsive, meaning 
that the addict is not able to refrain from taking drugs without help. (Hyman 2007)  
Research shows that the effect that addictive drugs have on the dopamine system is 
vastly larger than practically any other experience one can have. (Carter & Hall 
2012) This can explain how normal experiences seem dull and unimportant 
compared with getting high.  
To sum up, according to the brain disease model, addicted persons cannot by 
themselves say no to drugs, because the drugs have caused brain changes that leave 
them suffering from a mental disease that leave them unable to quit. 
 
A brain disease view of coercive treatment 
The brain disease model carries with it strong reasons for allowing coerced and even 
mandated addiction treatment. Because addicts are suffering from a disease which 
leaves them unable to quit, despite both strong incentives and strong desires to do 
just that, many scholars draw the conclusion that addict autonomy is in some way 
impaired by the addiction. (Charland 2002, Caplan 2006, Leshner 1997) The fact that 
the addict is suffering from impaired autonomy makes coercive actions fall under the 
definition of soft paternalism. Addicts are seen as not being able to make treatment 
decisions concerning their own disease, making their situation comparable to other 
groups that are not deemed completely autonomous, such as the severely mentally ill. 
This leaves the possibility open that the state can subject them to coercive and 
compulsory measures such as protective custody and coerced and even mandated 
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treatment. This provides a strong reason for coerced and even mandated treatment, 
and some would claim the only sufficient reason:  
"Forced treatment of addiction to prevent individuals from harming 
themselves would need to demonstrate that the individual in question is unable 
to choose not to use drugs, or in some other way cognitively impaired, so as to 
undermine their autonomy, either as a result of chronic drug use, or a comorbid 
psychiatric disorder." (Carter & Hall 2012 p.129) 
One argument for coercive treatment on the grounds of the brain disease model is the 
restoration of autonomy through the denial of autonomy. (Caplan 2006) The idea is 
that coercive and even mandatory treatment of drug addictions is morally viable, 
because it aims to restore addict autonomy. (Caplan 2006) It is based on the 
assumption that the addict's personal autonomy is impaired by the addiction, making 
it hard to perform basic personal and social tasks, such as planning ahead for one’s 
own good. One of these tasks is to be able to recognize that refraining from drug use 
is beneficial in the long run. If the addict cannot recognize this, it is because its 
ability to make autonomous choices is undermined. To coerce the addict into 
addiction treatment therefore takes on a double role, in that the state denies the addict 
the autonomous possibility of denying treatment, in order to restore the person's 
autonomy. (Caplan 2006) It is a treatment with the end goal of increasing autonomy.  
The idea using coercion or mandating people into gaining autonomy is parallel to 
the reasons for mandated schooling of children. In that knowledge, literacy, 
mathematical skills etc. bring on a higher level of autonomy. This is of course also 
true of mandated treatment of seriously mentally ill people, where the goal is to 
regain their autonomy and enter back into society. 
The brain disease view provides strong reasons for some form of coercive or 
mandated treatment as replacement for incarceration. The question which remains is: 
How impaired is addict autonomy? The amount of autonomy and ability to make 
treatment decisions becomes central, to the discussion of the coerced offer, as we 
shall see next.  
As we have seen, the brain disease view of addiction provides strong reasons for 
treating addicts paternalistically, because they are not considered autonomous. From 
23 
 
an extreme version of the brain disease view, the coerced offer of an anti-drug 
vaccine presented here may be unacceptable, both considered as punishment and as 
treatment. First, when the anti-drug vaccination is considered as punishment, it 
would be problematic if addict autonomy is also sidelined with that of severely 
mentally ill persons or children, since such persons should not be punished at all. 
Punishment is harm intentionally brought onto persons to express society's 
condemnation of the criminal act. (Kleinig 2007) Severely mentally ill persons are 
normally sentenced to undergo psychiatric treatment in a closed institution. This has 
completely different aims; to protect the person and others from herself and provide 
treatment for the illness. This is the position underlying the practices and legislation 
of most developed countries and the UN conventions. (UN 1991) If addiction is in 
fact a brain-disease which impairs autonomy, punishing addicts deviates strongly 
from this practice: "Drug dependence is a health disorder (a disease) that arises from 
the exposure to drugs in persons with these pre-existing psycho-biological 
vulnerabilities. Such an understanding of drug dependence, suggests that punishment 
is not the appropriate response to persons who are dependent on drugs." (UNODC 
2009 p.3) 2 
Even if the coerced choice of an anti-drug vaccine presented here is viewed as a 
treatment alternative to punishment, it would still be unacceptable from an extreme 
version of the brain disease view. This is because this view is not compatible with 
presenting an addict with any choice concerning their addiction. If the addiction 
really impairs their autonomy and ability to make treatment decisions in a 
fundamental way, it may be objected that a drug addict would not even be able to 
make a choice as constrained as the one suggested here. This objection has some 
weight to it. It does seem contradictory to claim that someone is unable to make 
informed choices about her disease, and then present them with such a choice. From 
                                                            
2 This is an interesting paradox, that medical authorities agree that addiction is an autonomy 
impairing brain disease,(NIDA 2012, EMCCDA 2012) and yet addicts are not treated as such by 
authorities in general. (Bennet 2011)  
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such a view of addict autonomy, mandated treatment is the only viable way to goif 
addicts are left completely incompetent by their addiction. 
 
The middle view of addiction 
If drug addiction is comparable to severe mental illness with regards to autonomy, 
then the objection that such patients should not be punished or presented with 
choices is quite compelling. However, many scholars and professionals in the field 
believe that addict autonomy is not in fact impaired so heavily by addiction that they 
should be completely incompetent in making treatment decisions: (Levy 2010, Carter 
& Hall 2012) "Both neuroscience and social science show that most addicted 
individuals retain some autonomous decision making capacity in regards to drug use. 
A major aim of treatment should be to facilitate and fortify patient autonomy." 
(Carter & Hall 2012 p.129) 
Neil Levy claims that it is not that addicts cannot choose for themselves, but that 
their impairment resides in the fact that their addiction leaves them unable to plan 
ahead. They always choose the quick pleasure of the drug instead of doing that which 
will give them greater pleasure in the long run; health, career, family etc. Thus, an 
agent may be capable of choice and suffer from diminished autonomy: (Levy 2012) 
"Their actions are the product of choices: each action is produced by a process 
that is sensitive to incentives, and is therefore, in one central sense of the term, 
voluntary. However, mere voluntariness is sufficient neither for autonomy nor 
for moral responsibility." (Levy 2012 p. 150) 
This view reintroduces the addict as a person who is able to make choices regarding 
their addiction, while maintaining that she is suffering from a disease which partly 
impairs autonomy and moral responsibility. This leaves open the possibility of 
punishing addicts, even though addiction is considered a brain disease, just as 
persons with less-severe mental disorders can also be held responsible for their 
actions and hence punished. The question remaining is of course; what can an addict 
be held responsible for? Neil Levy has a suggestion: "[…]to the extent to which it is 
reasonable to expect a particular addict to refrain from behaving in a particular way 
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on a particular occasion, that addict is morally responsible for their behavior." (Levy 
2012 p. 150) So each addict must be judged independently with regard to the strength 
of the addiction, the act and her resources. This accords well with the proposal 
defended here, that the strength of the addiction be evaluated by medical personnel. 
If someone should turn out to be so impaired by their addiction that they would not 
qualify for punishment or for making even very constrained choices, they should be 
treated accordingly. To others, using the coercive force of facing a prison sentence 
may be just the nudge the addicts need in order to have their autonomy restored. It 
seems that those who hold this middle position (that addiction is a brain disease 
which, to some extent, but far from completely, impairs addict autonomy) also take a 
moderate position on coercion: 
"This type of intervention which uses the coercive power of the criminal 
justice system, does not necessarily mean that treatment is compulsory or that 
it involves the deprivation of liberty of an individual: individuals still have a 
choice between accepting treatment, or facing imprisonment or other 
administrative sanctions." (UNODC 2009 p. 8) 
This leaves us with Caplan's idea of denying autonomy in order to restore it, applied 
to a moderate version of the brain disease model. Given that autonomy comes in 
degrees, and that addiction only partly impairs autonomy, and that coercive measures 
also come in degrees, the road is paved for a light form of coercion such as the one 
suggested here. The addicts are considered to be competent enough to make a choice, 
but they are on the other hand not completely autonomous, and thus a mild form of 
coercion (where they are subjected to a choice under the coercive force of the justice 
system) is in order without it qualifying as hard paternalism. 
Even though it fits very nicely with the coerced choice of an anti-drug vaccine, 
and the aim of this thesis is not to evaluate the accounts of addiction, it should be 
noted that this middle view of addiction raises some conceptual issues. One of them 
is that it seems peculiar to claim that someone is competent and autonomous enough 
to be punished, but lacks the ability to plan ahead. This ability is intuitively 
something that we expect from competent adults, and indeed it is one of the abilities 
that separate such individuals from children for example. Also Niel Levy’s view of 
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what an addict can be held responsible for bears a striking resemblance to a common 
view of children’s responsibility; that they can be held responsible for that which 
they normally can be expected to manage. We expect more responsibility from a 13 
year-old than a six year-old, but we do not, and this is important, judge them as 
competent adults. Competent adults are held responsible for that which all adults are 
expected to be held responsible for, not for what they can individually be held 
responsible for. This is reaching outside the scope of this thesis, and I suspect that 
this lack of precision is due to the complexity of the subject matter of addiction. 
 
Interim conclusion 
If addiction is a brain disease which impairs addict autonomy, then coercive and 
even mandated treatment can be justified as a case of soft paternalism. However, to 
an extreme version of the brain disease view of addiction, the offer suggested in this 
thesis will not be acceptable. If the use of an anti-drug vaccine is considered a means 
of criminal punishment, it would be unacceptable because addicts should not be 
subjected to criminal punishment at all, since they are not autonomous. If the anti-
drug vaccine is considered as a treatment alternative to criminal punishment, it is 
unacceptable because of the element of choice. If this version of the brain disease 
view is true, then addicts are not capable of making treatment decisions regarding 
their drug use. Instead, addicts should be treated mandatorily if necessary. 
If one believes, as many scholars and professionals do, that addict autonomy is 
something which is impaired but not absent, the case for the coercive offer of an anti-
drug vaccine becomes much stronger. Addicts can be held responsible for their 
criminal acts, and hence be tried and convicted and presented with the constrained 
choice between an anti-drug vaccine and incarceration. This can be done for soft-
paternalistic reasons because it will restore the part of their autonomy which has been 
impaired by the addiction.  
In the next section the main premise for these objections is changed, by not 
viewing addiction as a disease which impairs autonomy. 
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 The liberal view of addiction 
What if drug addiction is not a disease of the brain, but a temptation for pleasurable 
experiences like any other? This view of addiction and its implications for the moral 
viability of coerced use of an anti-drug vaccine will be discussed in the following 
two sections. 
There is growing consensus that addictive drugs change the brain in a sense that 
addiction to some extent 'takes place' in the brain in a physical sense. (Carter & Hall 
2012, NIDA 2012, EMCDDA 2012, Caplan 2006, Levy 2012) As mentioned earlier, 
the consensus among the official policy-guiding institutions in the field is that these 
changes constitute a mental illness, which causes at least some degree of impaired 
autonomy. (NIDA 2012) This view is challenged, however, by a number of scholars 
who, while acknowledging that addiction causes brain changes and that addiction is a 
serious problem both for the addict and society, refuse to acknowledge it as a disease 
which impairs autonomy. (Heyman 2009, Foddy & Savulescu 2010, Tännsjö 1999) 
This view of addiction has been dubbed the liberal view of addiction. On way of 
defining this view reads as follows: 
"The Liberal View contains only three claims about addiction. First, we do 
not know whether an addict values anything more than the satisfaction of his 
addictive desires. Second, we do not know whether an addict behaves 
autonomously when they use drugs. Third, addictive desires are just strong, 
regular appetitive desires." (Foddy & Savulescu 2010) 
The first claim is a response to the disease view's understanding of how addicts claim 
to want to quit while continuing their habit. In the disease view, this desire yet 
inability to quit is interpreted as a result of the disease of addiction compelling the 
addicts to continuous drug consumption. The claim of the liberal view is that we 
cannot know for certain what people’s real preferences are, unless we can read their 
minds. For example, interviews with addicts are often biased by the addicts trying to 
accord with society's expectations, and an addict is less likely to get help if she 
claims to want to quit but cannot, instead of admitting that she prefers getting high 
over other things like health, family and career. (Foddy & Savulescu 2010) 
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The second claim is the central one, and directly connected to the first. Although 
neuroscience and behavioral science have uncovered much about how addiction 
works, knowing for certain whether an individual is having her autonomy impaired 
by something which takes place inside the brain, is something which would require 
better mind-reading equipment than is available at the present time. (Foddy and 
Savulescu 2010) Thus, the best answers to questions about addict autonomy are 
perhaps not found in neuroscience (yet) but in the behavioral sciences: “[T]he debate 
about the nature of addiction has been framed as a biological issue, yet the biological 
data have not helped solve it. The reason is that the criteria for deciding whether an 
activity is voluntary are behavioral. We do not look at people’s genes to determine if 
they are engaged in a voluntary or involuntary act, we look at their behavior. 
Similarly, we do not look at their brains to decide if their actions are voluntary or 
not. This is not to deny that there are biological underpinnings to the distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary acts. Rather, the point is that the distinction rests 
on criteria that precede what we have learned about the brain. Possibly a better set of 
criteria will emerge, but future developments cannot possibly be relevant to the 
current discussion of whether addiction is a disease." (Heyman 2009 p.97) 
The third claim does not leave out that there may be desires that are so strong that 
they can be experienced as impairing a person's ability to pursue her own goals. But 
these desires for drugs are in principle no different than what takes place when we 
are tempted by any other pleasurable experience. Addiction is a negative 
consequence of chasing pleasure, and addicts should be treated as healthy, 
autonomous individuals who can choose to quit, treating them as ill people is 
demeaning and incorrect. (Foddy & Savulescu 2010)  
The reason why the brain disease model has become predominant is that the 
neuroscience of addiction is flawed to begin with; because it initially frames 
addictive behavior as something abnormal. As a result, every finding that 
neuroscience achieves in trying to unlock the mystery of addiction is automatically 
framed as being unique to addiction. This causes researchers to overlook the fact that 
seeking pleasure through drugs is very much like seeking pleasure in other ways. 
(Foddy & Savulescu 2010) Recall the account of the addiction working through the 
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learning and rewards system in the brain. "...addiction researchers sometimes claim 
that drug use changes a person’s brain, without recognizing that all pleasure oriented 
behaviors change our brains, through the same mechanisms." (Foddy & Savulescu 
2010 p.3) What Foddy and Savulescu are claiming, is that the proponents of the 
brain-disease model are ignoring the fact that all human pleasure works through the 
opioid and dopamine system, not only pleasure achieved through addictive 
substances. It is our way of feeling pleasure (whether it is through a shot of heroin, 
buying a new car, or having an orgasm) and there is nothing special about getting 
your dopamine or opioid receptors activated by using drugs. 
This claim is supported by the observation that by far drugs are not the only thing 
people can become addicted to. Sugar, sex, shopping, gambling or anything that 
causes pleasurable sensations can cause addiction-like reactions4. In the liberal view, 
this is a challenge for the brain disease view, because it claims that drug addiction is 
a unique disease. 
The problem according to Foddy and Savulescu is that the taboos concerning the 
use of drugs affect even the most independent neuroscientists in that the addicted 
brain is much better examined than the 'normal' brain. Because normal human 
pleasure-seeking is not considered a problem, funding for this type of research is not 
as prevalent as it is for the problem of addiction. 
As mentioned earlier, the dispute over the nature of addiction and its implications 
for addict autonomy is not to be settled here. What this section attempts to capture is 
that addiction is not necessarily a disease which impairs addicts autonomy; it may be 
a case of autonomous people with strong desires. If this is the case, it will have 
implications for whether the coerced use of an anti-drug vaccine will be morally 
acceptable for paternalistic reasons. This will be discussed in the next section. 
  
                                                            
4 It is still debatable whether dependencies that are not caused by drugs are clinically to be 
named addictions, although in lay terms they are often referred to as just that fx. 'food addiction'   
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Objections from a liberal view of addiction 
This section will argue that even those who hold a liberal view of addiction can give 
paternalistic reasons for coercive treatment, although the arguments for it are quite 
different from those put forth by the proponents of the brain disease model. If addicts 
are indeed as autonomous as other persons, then any coerced treatment, for the good 
of the addicts themselves, will go under the definition of hard paternalism, where 
autonomous and competent people are treated against their will for their own good. 
Being a proponent of the liberal view of addiction does not of course exclude 
agreeing to some cases of hard paternalism: 
"We may also find justifications for “treating” addicts against their will, but 
the justification for this decision cannot rest on the assumption that that addict 
has lost her autonomy. It will be a paternalistic intervention aimed at correcting 
social problems and improving an addict’s life in a normative sense (at the cost 
of their autonomy). The fiction that an addict ought to be treated against her 
will—because the addiction is proof of lost autonomy—must be abandoned." 
(Foddy and Savulescu 2010 p.17) 
As the above quote exemplifies, it is an open question whether coerced treatment can 
be accepted as a case of morally acceptable hard paternalism, or whether it is 
unacceptable unless neuroscience can show that "people experiencing addictions are 
incapable of making treatment decisions." (Wild et al. 2012 p.2) 
The debate becomes one about the moral status of hard paternalism. Many 
societies do have practices that could be considered as hard paternalism. 
Autonomous people are mandated to wear seat belts if they wish to drive a car, wear 
helmets on a motorcycle and be insured if they own a house to mention a few 
examples. Societies force people, autonomous or not, for their own good all the time. 
The rationale for justifying mandatory education is similar: forcing autonomous 
parents to educate their children, so they can gain something (knowledge) that will 
give them a higher degree of autonomy. (Caplan 2006) 
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This is not to say that all cases of hard paternalism are morally acceptable, but to 
say that there are other cases where we accept it, because of great advantages and 
small costs to the individuals.  
Situations of medical treatment, however, are often thought to be different, and 
although the state may try to influence its citizens into making wise medical and 
health choices, directly paternalist actions in the healthcare system is shunned by 
many: "[…]people in liberal societies are not usually under any obligation to do what 
is good for them. Individuals generally have a right to pursue unhealthy lifestyles if 
they so wish and are not obliged to seek help to alleviate any afflictions from which 
they may suffer." (Seddon 2007 p.275) 
There can be strong intuitions against treating people medically against their will. 
Grabbing addicts off the street and forcing them into treatment aligns quite badly 
with the ideals of a liberal society. Although the coerced offer bears very little 
resemblance to that scenario, there are, as we shall see objections to exposing 
persons to coercive circumstances in order to make them choose an anti-drug 
vaccine.  
One note must be made before proceeding with the objections to the anti-drug 
vaccine. From the liberal view, this type of treatment may seem contradictory. For 
how can one support giving a vaccine against a disease, while at the same time 
holding that there is no such disease? However, provided the anti-drug vaccine works 
and actually does make the addict either not want or unable to enjoy a particular drug 
(as is assumed in this thesis), the use of an anti-drug vaccine is not in opposition to 
the liberal view of addiction. As we have seen, the proponents of the liberal view do 
not deny that addictive drugs change the brain. Rather, they question whether these 
changes can be considered a disease, or they are to be compared to 'normal' desires, 
only stronger. The anti-drug vaccine works to somehow make the addict immune to 
these desires, or unable to fulfill them. Then the vaccine would enhance an existing 
human capacity, by acting directly on the body (and brain). In this case the treatment 
could be defined as a biomedical enhancement and not therapeutic disease treatment. 
(Buchanan 2011) 
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Having established that coerced use of an anti-drug vaccine for paternalist reasons 
is not in opposition to the liberal view of addiction (in principle), the next section 
presents a series of objections to such a treatment based on a liberal view of 
addiction. The first objections are put forth by Torbjörn Tännsjö in Coercive Care 
(1999). The section starts with an analysis of his initial claim that any coercive 
treatment of autonomous persons is morally unacceptable. I will attempt to show that 
this is not true for the situation in question here.  
 
Anti-drug vaccines as hard paternalism 
Since it is now established that from the liberal view of addiction, the coercive 
choice of an anti-drug vaccine presented for the good of the addict would be a case 
of hard paternalism, it is time to consider an objection which claims that this is an 
unacceptable case of such paternalistic measures.  
Torbjörn Tännsjö does not allow for any hard paternalism, and according to him, 
addicts are autonomous (Tännsjö 1999). He claims that all forms of coercive 
treatment of addiction is wrong, with two exceptions. 1) If the addict is delirious OR 
2) volunteers to be compulsively treated, should he or she have relapses. (Tännsjö 
1999) As we shall, see positive incentives qualify as coercion in his definition, as 
well as in the definition used in this thesis. 
He rejects offers of coercive treatment based on "the principle of respect for the 
autonomy of the individual in decisions about medical care and social services." 
(Tännsjö 1999 p.2)  
He bases this principle on John Stuart-Mills reasons for anti-paternalism. Tännsjö 
argues that the autonomy of a person should not be violated for paternalistic health 
reasons. For this he gives three reasons. First, we all have a special interest in our 
own well-being. In other words we all have to live our own lives in our own bodies, 
and because of this, we should be able to decide for ourselves how our lives are 
shaped. Second, we have a privileged epistemological position to our own state of 
being and therefore other people should not decide for us. Even if doctors may know 
more about the medical facts, only we know first-hand, how they affect us. Third, 
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there is always a price to be paid for having ones autonomy intervened with, and it is 
not nice to be coerced. (Tännsjö 1999) It may very well be that cases of mandatory 
care and various forms of hard paternalism in the healthcare system are morally 
objectionable, and that this principle of anti-paternalism is a good principle in that 
context. However, the situation discussed here is significantly different. Here we are 
dealing with a case of a treatment which is being offered as an alternative to 
punishment, and my claim is that these special circumstances cause Tännsjö's 
objection to fail. The premise that makes this case differ from normal cases of 
healthcare is that since the person has committed a crime, it is permissible for the 
state to restrict her in ways it would be impermissible to treat other persons. (Douglas 
2013,2) Hence, the anti-drug vaccine treatment must be contrasted with the other 
choices available to the convicted person (that of incarceration, not with no sanction 
at all) as would be the case of normal healthcare. This is the light in which "the 
principle of respect for the autonomy of the individual in decisions about medical 
care and social services" should be viewed in, if it is to be applied to the coerced use 
of an anti-drug vaccine . 
Considering Tännsjö's three reasons in this light reveals that the convicted person 
is already in a situation where her special interests are being set aside. Being allowed 
to choose between treatment and incarceration can hardly be said to be paying less 
attention to those special interests, than simply incarcerating her. Compared to a 
simple prison sentence, the choice between an anti-drug vaccine and a prison 
sentence broadens the convicted person’s possibility to act on her privileged 
epistemological position. Although it is an extension of possibilities for the convict 
in question, it is as mentioned before, not a free choice, as the constrained choice 
made in a setting of the courtroom does entail some degree of coercion. That is the 
price to be paid; coercion is not nice, not even the milder versions. However, prison 
is not nice either, and it is not meant to be, at least from some views of criminal 
justice, as we shall see later. In the end, two costs should be weighed against each 
other; the cost of making a mildly coercive offer and the costs of not getting that 
gentle push into a treatment which could end a burdensome addiction. 
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The costs of coercion are that some persons are being treated in a paternalistic 
way, despite the fact that they are considered competent. The personal gains of being 
able to make such an offer, is that their choices are doubled. Not to mention all the 
advantages of being drug-free. Considered in the context of a treatment offered as an 
alternative to incarceration, the principle of respect for the autonomy of the 
individual in decisions about medical care and social services loses its relevance 
because of the constrained situation in which the convicted person is. However, 
applying Tännsjös principle to a punitive situation, as I have done here, may be 
problematic. The next section will discuss his prohibition on mixing treatment with 
punishment. 
 
Must treatment and punishment never be mixed? 
Another objection put forth by Tännsjö is that the entire idea of replacing punishment 
with treatment or using treatment as punishment is unacceptable. He claims it is very 
important that society draws a sharp demarcation line between care and punishment. 
(Tännsjö 1999)  
Punishment is never given solely for paternalistic reasons, there is always an 
element of satisfying ideals of justice or bringing about some good consequences for 
society, or both. His objection is that using care or treatment coercively is 
unacceptable, if it is not done solely for the good of the person treated: "[W]hen a 
person is coerced in the interest of another person the means should never be care." 
(Tännsjö 1999 p.6) If this is true, using an anti-drug vaccine as punishment, or part 
of a punishment, is clearly prohibited, because punishment always has more to its 
intention than the sole good of the punished. 
Using the anti-drug vaccine as a therapy which can be chosen instead of 
punishment (which in theory could be done for only paternalistic reasons), is also 
prohibited, since, as we have seen, Tännsjö accepts no coercive treatment of fully 
autonomous persons. 
The question that remains is of course why it is unacceptable for any coerced 
treatment or care to be given in the interest of other persons. He gives two reasons 
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for this. The first is that by treating people coercively for mixed reasons of both their 
own good and the good of others, there is a risk we may harm them. The second 
reason is directly connected to the first, in that even if we do not harm the person 
treated coercively, they may fear that we are harming them, and this will be very 
harmful to the healthcare system, because people will lose faith in it. Again, this may 
be true of the healthcare system in general, but these reasons do not apply very well 
to the situation considered here. 
Yes, we may harm them, but that is not a problem for punishment, since it is part 
of the reason for punishment in the first place. Seen as a treatment alternative to 
punishment, one must look at the alternative of incarceration which is (as shown in 
the introduction, also harmful) both mentally and physically, especially if the drug 
habit is continued. 
As for the detrimental effects on the healthcare system, this proposal does not take 
place within that system, but in the system of penal justice. I dare to assume that 
even addicted convicts can tell the difference, and henceforth do not lose faith in one 
system, by being subjected to a coerced choice in the other. 
 
Does coercion compromise treatment? 
An empirical objection which is frequently raised in the debate over coerced 
addiction treatment is that coerced treatment is not effective, because it is coercive: 
(Seddon 2007, Tännsjö 1999, Wild et al. 2012)  
"However, when a person is forced to join a programme against his or her 
drug abuse, then this is objectionable. Neither should he or she be punished for 
refusing to join the programme (as is being done when something extra is 
added to the punishment if the person does not comply with the programme). 
Not even positive rewards should be allowed. Such measures mean that the 
treatment against the addiction will be seriously compromised. In this, 
treatment of drug addiction is no different from treatment of mental illness, 
psychopathology, sexual abnormality and so forth." (Tännsjö 1999 p.134) 
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The offer suggested in this thesis can be considered as a positive reward, in the sense 
that Tännsjö puts forth here, if indeed the addict finds getting a vaccine is better than 
going to prison. 
I want to make two points to counter this objection. First, with regards to the 
existing forms of coerced and mandated treatments, the issue is far from settled. 
Tännsjö presents results that support his claim, and there are results that show the 
exact opposite. In a review of the clinical research on the area of effectiveness of 
coerced addiction treatment Miller and Flaherty conclude the following:  
"The convicted abuser can be given an opportunity to mitigate their sentence 
if they comply with addiction treatment. The studies to date uniformly 
supported that coerced addiction treatment resulted in favorable outcomes in 
these patient/criminal populations. The coerced convicts complied equally as 
well as those who are not mandated to treatment. The studies also showed a 
reduction in criminal activity and improved psychosocial status from 
compliance with addiction treatment." (Miller & Flaherty 2000 p.11) 
Even if this one survey does not by itself definitively settle the issue on the efficiency 
of coerced treatment, simply stating that coercion compromises treatment (and 
referring to one survey supporting the statement) does not settle the issue either  
The question of whether the existing forms of coercion actually work is quite 
poorly researched, partly because of methodological issues, such as widely differing 
definitions of coercion. (Wild et al. 2012) 
My second point is to emphasize that the assumption made in this thesis that the 
vaccine in question will of course function as it should (pharmacologically speaking) 
in that it will succeed in making the person abstain from drugs/using drugs/drug use. 
However, Tännsjö might still have a point here, if he is referring to the fact that 
treatment does not deal with the social problems of addiction. That taking away 
people's possibility of choosing to quit, will disempower them, leaving them drug-
free but in the same situation which caused them to take drugs in the first place, so 
that once the probation period is over, and the vaccine stops working, they will 
resume their habit. Although this may be a legitimate concern, it does not disqualify 
the offer of an anti-drug vaccine. Rather, it begs the question of whether there are 
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more compelling alternatives. It is hard to see how status quo is a better option for 
the individual, e.g. incarcerate the addicts and have them face the high rates of 
recidivism and good possibilities for continuing their drug abuse in prison (as 
described in the introduction) and then throw them back into the life that they lived 
before prison. Anyone favoring this type of empirical objections, must present a 
better solution and prison is not it. In fact, the failure of incarceration as a means of 
reducing drug abuse may even be seen as a very good reason to prefer treatment: 
"The most plausible argument for legally coercing drug offenders to enter 
drug treatment is not that it is an extremely effective intervention but because 
the alternative of imprisonment is so expensive and ineffective in reducing 
drug use and crime." (Hall 1997 p.12) 
Regardless of whether the anti-drug vaccine works or not, there are theoretical 
objections to the coerced use of the anti-drug vaccine for paternalist reasons. One of 
these is presented in the next section.  
 
May treatment lead to a shorter sentence? 
Another line of objection which Tännsjö puts forth is that giving prisoners a shorter 
sentence in return for taking an anti-drug vaccine is unacceptable, while shortening 
prisoners’ sentences if they take the vaccine is acceptable. 
"But is it coercion to offer a person release from prison, if he or she 
successfully concludes a programme aimed at curing his or her addiction? It is 
not, it seems to me, if the crucial thing is whether the person does prove less 
dangerous, after having concluded the treatment. Compliance with the 
programme as such should not lead to a shorter punishment. This would be 
objectionable. But the success of the programme, documented somehow, could 
legitimately result in a shortened punishment. If some treatment exists then, it 
should be offered to the criminal, but only on a voluntary basis. If the criminal 
complies with the treatment, then this should not mean automatically that he or 
she will be released (any earlier). However, if he or she does comply with the 
programme, and, after having done so, turns out to be less dangerous, then this 
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may be a legitimate (and perfectly reasonable) ground for setting him or her 
free earlier, on parole, say." (Tännsjö 1999 p.134) 
To begin with, this objection can be challenged empirically. As shown in the 
introduction, imprisonment is known to generate both more hardened criminals and 
more dependent addicts. If the addicts are kept in prison until they have proven that 
the treatment has worked, the advantageous effects of keeping them out of prison 
will be in the very least greatly compromised. (Ashcroft et al. 2006) This may also 
enhance problems such as switching to other drugs than the one vaccinated against, 
and will decrease the bargaining power of the deal, especially for shorter sentences.  
Setting these important empirical objections aside, the question remains whether 
there is a significant difference between offering an anti-drug vaccine in return for 
early release, and releasing prisoners early if they take the anti-drug vaccine and 
hence are considered less dangerous? 
As I read it, there are two ways in which my proposal could be challenged from 
Tännsjö’s alternative suggestion. One is that my suggestion is coercive, while 
Tännsjö's is not, and thus his is acceptable and mine is not, if we, for the sake of 
argument, accept that only soft paternalism is acceptable. The second, is that my 
suggestion may lead to the release of a dangerous persons, while his does not, this 
will be considered later. 
First, according to Tännsjö, the cases are different in that giving the reduced 
sentence as a positive incentive is coercive, while releasing because the level of 
dangerousness has fallen is not: 
"It is a case of coercive care, however, when, intentionally, through the use 
of force, or threats, or manipulation, or positive incentives (or gratifications), 
the person is made to accept (or simply to undergo) a certain treatment he or 
she does not want to undergo (in the absence of the force, the threat, or the 
incentives, or gratifications)." (Tännsjö 1999 p.9) 
Recall that Tännsjö is opposed to any type of coercion within treatment of addiction, 
and his two exceptions do not apply here. He claims that there is a difference 
between making an offer of early release (coercive) and releasing patients who 
successfully complete treatment early (not coercive). 
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His example concerning medical castration is parallel to that of addiction 
treatment in prisons: telling a sex-offender that he will be released early if he is 
medically castrated, would also be wrong. However, "It is not coercion to inform a 
person that, if he undergoes medical castration, he will be out of prison earlier than if 
he does not." (Tännsjö 1999 p.10) In this excerpt we can exchange ‘medical 
castration’ with ‘an anti-drug vaccine’ as the two cases are completely parallel in the 
relevant respects. 
What I intend to show is that Tännsjö is contradicting himself by proposing an 
alternative which is coercive according to his own definition of coercion. He 
dismisses treatment offers such as the one made in this thesis on the grounds that it is 
coercive. Meanwhile his own alternative can also be seen as coercive, by his own 
definition of coercive offers. This is because Tännsjö broadens his definition of 
coercion to be dependent on the intention of the coercer: "How are we to draw the 
line between coercion and persuasion? We should draw it in terms of the intention 
behind the measure taken, I suggest." (Tännsjö 1999 p. 10) If the difference between 
coercion and persuasion lies in the intention of the coercer, then coercion also 
includes manipulation.(see quote p. 38) I take manipulation to be a form of 
persuasion through unfair means, such as lying, holding back vital parts of the truth, 
or communicating indirectly to hide one’s intentions. This means that two identical 
offers can be both coercive and not coercive, depending on the intention behind the 
offer. This is quite different from the rewriting of Nozick's conditions for coercion 
from the introduction: 
1. The justice system aims to get a convicted addict to take an anti-drug vaccine; 
2. The justice system communicates the claim that it wants the addict to take the 
anti-drug vaccine; 
3. The justice system's claim indicates that if that addict does not take the vaccine, 
then the justice system will make the convicted addict serve the entire term 
punishment that she has been sentenced, making not taking the vaccine less desirable 
to the addict; 
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4. The justice systems claim is credible to the addict (or it would be a very poor 
justice system); 
5. The addict takes the vaccine; 
6. Part of the addict's reason for taking the vaccine is the likelihood of not having 
to serve the full sentence. 
The conditions that are relevant in comparing the two cases are 2, 3, 4 and 6. In this 
case one can assume that if 3 and 5 are fulfilled, there is a good chance that 6 will 
also be. If the intention of the coercer is what makes an offer coercive, and 
manipulation can also be coercion, then 6 is irrelevant, how the coercee perceives the 
situation ceases to be important in Tännsjö’s definition of coercion. 
What shall we make of 3 in this case? Considering the assumed effectiveness of 
the vaccine, I assume that in cases of voluntary vaccination against drug addiction in 
prisons, the prisoner is aware that if she takes the vaccine, there is a substantially 
greater chance of being considered less dangerous. This will make her more eligible 
for parole, and it seems likely that this will make not taking the vaccine less desirable 
to the her. The crux however is condition 2. If manipulation is also coercion (and 
what decides whether something is manipulation or persuasion is the intent of the 
person5 or institution making the offer), then the question of whether voluntary drug 
vaccination offers are coercive, because taking them almost certainly leads early 
release, ultimately ends at the intention of the system or person who makes the offer.  
If it is presented as an offer with the intention to make the addict agree to the 
treatment, it is clearly a case of coercion, according to both Nozick and Tännsjö. To 
Nozick's definition the case seems clear-cut, the justice system communicates that it 
wants the convicted person to take the anti-drug vaccine, if the person does so, 
against her initial will and because of the pressure from the justice system, she has 
been coerced into it. Making the concept of coercion depend on the manipulative 
intention of the corercer, makes it possible that a person may be coerced without the 
                                                            
5 The idea of intention is stretched beyond individuals, it is assumed that also institutions can 
have some kind of "institutional intent". (Tannsjd 1999 p.10) 
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coercer revealing the coercive intent by communicating indirectly, which is what I 
claim the penal system does in Tännsjö's alternative. In cases of manipulative 
coercion, we cannot know whether coercion has taken place without asking the 
manipulator, since it is her (or its in this case) intent which counts. In this case, if the 
information that prisoners can be released early if they are considered less dangerous 
is released simultaneously with the information that taking an anti-drug vaccine will 
make all addicted convicts less dangerous, it cannot be ruled out to be a case of 
coercion since it may be the intent of the penal justice system to hereby manipulate 
prisoners into taking the vaccine. If some of them do, it is irrelevant if they feel 
coerced, because they may have been manipulated.  
In fact, the prisoners are likely to be manipulated if that is the intention. I assume 
that information of this sort travels fast, and that prisoners can add two and two 
together to understand that taking the vaccine will almost certainly lead to early 
release. What else could be a more interesting topic for prison conversation than 
possibilities for an early release or parole?  
The fact that Tännsjö’s own suggestion falls under his own definition of coercion, 
but curiously enough, not under Nozick’s, disqualifies it as an alternative and hence 
as an objection to the coerced offer of an anti-drug vaccine, since, as we have seen, 
he is opposed to hard paternalism. However, for the reasons stated earlier, this poses 
no problem for the use of an anti-drug vaccine, which I am suggesting. There is of 
course nothing in my suggestion that opposes also introducing the anti-drug vaccine 
as a voluntary treatment program inside prisons alongside the coercive choice model.  
 
There is also a further problem with intention and coercion if coercion is 
dependent on the intention of the coercer. If we also assume, for the sake of 
argument, that coercive measures that have any goals other than the good of the 
coercee are not allowed. Then it is hard to see how any treatment offers with the 
intent to reduce crime or costs in the healthcare system are in fact unacceptable 
because they may also do society some good. Even treatment offers in which the 
recipient does not feel coerced, are not allowed if the institutional intent is that the 
person ought to take the offer that is partly given to reduce crime. If the intention of 
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the offer-giver is to make the person take an offer which she is initially skeptical 
towards, then this could be interpreted as coercion. This seems counter to the 
intuitions we usually have about coercion, and results in a much too restrictive 
attitude towards treatment offers.   
The second part of this objection, that offering an anti-drug vaccine may result in 
releasing dangerous criminals, is a genuine concern, and an empirical problem which 
is very hard to solve. Tännsjö acknowledges this by stating: "[p]redictions of the 
dangerousness of a person are notoriously difficult to make. Predictions of how such 
predictions will turn out are even more difficult to make. That is why such 
predictions should not be the basis of compulsory commitment." (Tännsjö 1999 p.7) 
Considering this view, it is curious that he suggests such predictions should be used 
as a yardstick for decisions about early release. In any case, this is an objection 
which can also be raised against incarceration, in that dangerous persons are also 
frequently known to be released once their sentence is served. 
 
Who are we to judge?  
In the hypothetical case considered in this thesis, the vaccine does work, but even if 
such an effective vaccine was developed, Tännsjö still would not allow for coerced 
treatment:"For suppose that it emerged that, contrary to what seems now to be part of 
the received opinion, a (new) kind of therapy proved extremely effective. Would this 
provide us with a reason to permit this therapy to be given coercively? I think not." 
(Tännsjö 1999 p. 135) 
He argues, if such an effective treatment was developed, most addicts would 
volunteer for it, and the those who do not would have a good reason for continuing 
their habit. It is not made explicit what type of reason this might be, but it could 
plausibly be that taking the particular drug enriches their lives in such a way that they 
are willing to live with consequences rather than being barred from that experience. 
This could be compared to certain religious cultures, which hold certain drugs to be 
central in making contact with their divinity, such as the use of cannabis in the 
Rastafari culture. It may also just be a lifestyle choice. Having the state decide on 
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what means we use to enrichour inner lives is highly controversial, and it may be put 
forward that it is indeed not the state’s business. Or as Tännsjö asks: "who are we to 
judge?" (Tännsjö 1999 p.135) 
Well, we as a society make judgments like this all the time, for example, most 
psychotropic drug are illegal, including the ones considered in this thesis. Thus, this 
objection seems better aimed at a debate on the legalization of psychotropic drugs. 
That discussion is not within the scope of this thesis. As long as the drugs in question 
are illegal, it seems far-fetched that coercing people using the definition of the word 
applied here would deprive them of a morally important right, compared to the right 
taken from them by making the drugs illegal. If continued drug use is something that 
people should have the right to (and that may very well be), then coercive measures 
like the one proposed here is not the problem, the problem is criminalization of the 
drugs themselves. Add to this the fact that if addicts have such a good reason to 
continue their habit, they are free to choose to go to prison for it. 
Leaving Torbjörn Tännsjö's objections, the next section will take a closer look at 
an objection which claims that the offer itself is inappropriate. 
 
Would the state be making an illegitimate offer? 
The idea of the state making a coerced offer of treatment can also be objected from 
the point of view that the state is not in a position where it should make such an 
offer. (Bomann-Larsen 2011) The idea is that coerced treatment offers are only 
morally acceptable if they are very specifically focused to only treat that which the 
person is convicted of. This is an objection to offering the anti-drug vaccine for 
sentences beyond directly drug-related crimes such as the possession and sale of 
drugs. The principle behind this objection is that there are limits to what the state's 
business is, and that making coercive offers outside of this business is wrong. The 
argument can be structured in the following way:  
"A) An offer is wrong in itself, if it is made by someone who does not stand 
in the right normative position, vis-à-vis the other, to make it. B) The state does 
not stand in the right normative position vis-à-vis the criminal if it offers 
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rehabilitative treatment that goes beyond the behaviour for which the criminal 
is convicted. Therefore: It is wrong for the state to offer rehabilitative treatment 
that goes beyond the behaviour for which the criminal is convicted." (Ryberg 
& Petersen 2011 p.2) 
As regards premise A, as Ryberg and Petersen have shown, it is debateable 
whether there are in fact offers which are wrong in themselves. (Ryberg & Petersen 
2011) Claims that the offer-giver fails to treat the coercee as a “moral equal” and 
fails to recognize her “claim to moral respect” (Bomann Larsen 2011 p.9) do little to 
clarify this. However, even if we do for argument's sake accept that there are such 
offers, it is not clear that this is one of them. Bomann-Larsen claims that this type of 
offer is not morally valid unless the state is in a position to make it; she dubs this the 
"appropriateness constraint." (Bomann-Larsen 2011 p.2) For an offer to live up to 
this constraint: "[i]t is suggested that the state may only offer solutions to 
behavioural problems for which the convict is answerable to the state." (Bomann-
Larsen 2011, p.1)  
In this case, it would mean that the anti-drug vaccine offer will be limited to 
directly drug-related crimes such as possession and sale of drugs. This objection only 
applies to cases where the anti-drug vaccine is considered treatment that replaces 
punishment. Since if it is considered punishment, it either needs to bring about good 
consequences and/or make sure justice is done, usually by harming the convicted 
person proportionately to the crime. (I will return to different theories of punishment 
in a part 2.) One problem with this is that it is not clear why the appropriateness 
constraint should be specified as what the convict is answerable to to the state. 
Where and when it is appropriate for the state to make offers is an open question, 
which depends on what is the legitimate function of the state. It may just as well be 
that it is appropriate for the state to protect its citizens and prevent crime. (Ryberg & 
Petersen 2011) From a paternalist viewpoint, it could very well be the business of the 
state to coerce those who cannot treat themselves into choosing treatment. As shown 
above, this is a matter which rests on which understanding of addict autonomy one 
subscribes to. If addicts are not considered completely autonomous, then it would 
seem indeed very plausible that it is the concern of the state to make such offers. In 
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order to help keep less-than-autonomous person out of trouble. As we have seen, 
from a liberal view of addiction it becomes a question of whether hard paternalism is 
acceptable. In any of these cases it is not clear why the limit to what type of 
behavioral problems it is appropriate for the state to make coercive offers about is 
specified as only those which have directly caused the crimes the person is convicted 
of. (Ryberg & Petersen 2011) This applies especially for drug addiction, where many 
of the crimes are committed to finance the habit, and as a bi-product of being 
intoxicated. If one agrees that reducing crime is the business of the state, for either 
paternalistic or reasons which aim at the good of society, or both, then offering anti-
drug vaccines is indeed a legitimate offer.. 
Having shown that the offer suggested here may indeed be legitimate, the next 
section brings forth the objection that it is unacceptable because the coercive nature 
of the offer undermines the possibility of giving valid consent. 
 
Does the offer undermine consent? 
One objection to presenting individuals with coercive treatment choices is that it 
undermines valid consent. The notion of informed consent is considered a basic right 
in the healthcare system (AMA) and though prisoners have limitations on their 
rights, they do normally have the right to informed consent when being treated 
medically. (Farrah 2004) The principle states that fully competent patients should 
have all relevant information about their illness and be given the possibility to 
decline any treatment: "Informed consent is commonly taken to require that the 
individual:  
(1) has the capacity to understand the treatment and communicate their wishes, or 
cognitive capacity;  
(2) is free to make decisions (i.e. internally or externally uncoerced or volitional 
capacity; and  
(3) is informed of the risks and benefits of treatment, as well as those of other 
treatment options." (Carter & Hall 2012 p.106) 
How do these conditions for informed consent affect the case presented here?  
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Condition 3 should not present a problem, as it is assumed that the addict will be 
given all the relevant information regarding the anti-drug vaccine prior to choosing. 
Condition 1 would not be met in cases where addicts are in a state of delirium or 
have a comorbid psychiatric condition or the like, but that is no different from non-
addicted individuals. (Carter & Hall 2012) Also, to someone who adheres to the 
brain disease model for addiction in an extreme version, the addiction is thought to 
be so autonomy-impairing that addicts do not meet condition 1. (Carter & Hall 2012, 
Charland 2002) As I have argued earlier, presenting an addict with any kind of 
treatment choice would seem contradictory to this view, thus consent is not an 
option. To hold this view does require an understanding of addiction which is not 
commonly held, and empirically dubious. (Carter & Hall 2012) 
Condition 2 is where addiction is different from other medical conditions or 
ilnesses in need of treatment. Note the distinction here between internal and external 
coercion. Addicts can be internally coerced by their addiction. The internal coercion 
translates to the autonomy discussion that has filled most of this section. No more 
shall be said except that most accounts, apart from extreme versions of the brain 
disease model, do not consider the internal coercion caused by drug abuse to be 
strong enough to invalidate consent to treatment: "A commonly held (and we believe 
to be reasonable) view is that drug-dependent people are able to give free and 
informed consent if they are not intoxicated or suffering acute withdrawal symptoms 
at the time when consent is requested." (Carter & Hall 2012 p.115) This is all that 
will be written about internal coercion here.  
The main interest of this section is external coercion and the question of whether 
an individual’s consent can still be valid, even when obtained as a result of a 
coercive offer. From condition 3, the case appears to be clear-cut: external coercion 
will invalidate consent. One note to make before we proceed is that coercion is an 
inherently subjective concept and with the definition of coercion used here, how the 
coercion is perceived by the coercee is important. (Seddon 2007) The coerciveness of 
the situation where an addict is given a choice between punishments will of course 
be perceived very differently from person to person. Indeed one study "...found that 
addicted individuals entering treatment generally had very poor recall of the consent 
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process." (Carter & Hall 2012 p. 108) However, as we have established, the situation 
is coercive by definition. And it is supposed to be, in order to make the addicts take 
the vaccine, for their own good. Even so, some would still prefer not presenting 
addicts with a choice: 
"Further, being forced to choose between imprisonment and “medical 
treatment” with a pharmacotherapy drug is inherently coercive. There are very 
few things that people will avoid more than going to jail or prison. Informed 
consent is incompatible with inherently coercive situations that force a person 
to barter his or her natural neuro- and biochemistry in exchange for freedom." 
(CCLE 2004 p.33).  
Although informed consent is in general a very useful and necessary concept, in this 
case it does seem to defeat the purpose of protecting the patient by restricting her 
options. Lene Bomann-Larsen uses an example of a person on death row to show the 
absurdity of this objection. Not offering the anti-drug vaccine to an addicted convict 
would be parallel to telling the prisoner on death row that "[s]ince we respect your 
sovereign right to self-determination we will not offer you treatment for the 
behaviour for which we will kill you, since we are afraid that you might feel 
pressured to accept (since we will otherwise kill you), and thus that your consent to 
the treatment is invalid you, so we will kill you instead." (Bomann-Larsen 2011 p.11)  
In the example above the death sentence can be replaced by a prison sentence and 
it becomes obvious that the harm of the coercive the situation is still not anywhere 
near the advantage of getting a choice over no choice6.What makes the difference 
here is how coercion is interpreted to affect an individual's autonomy: 
"Granted a distinction between manipulative coercion (which restricts 
autonomy) and coercive circumstances (which restrict freedom), effective consent 
thus appears obtainable even in the coercive circumstance of voluntary 
rehabilitation." (Bomann Larsen 2011 p.4) 
                                                            
6 Bomann-Larsen does not agree that this example can be extended to other cases than those of 
capital punishment. 
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The point is that because the outcome for the addict cannot be any worse due to the 
offer, then her individual autonomy is not threatened. The situation does not include 
a free choice. Indeed the choices are extremely constrained: prison or vaccination, 
and the coercive element is there because of the unpleasantness of prison, making it 
an un-free but not autonomy-undermining situation. The term 'manipulative' is 
maybe not the best choice to contrast the two, as the justice system is also trying to 
manipulate the coercee in the case of coercive circumstances, by using the situation 
to make the addicts make the right choice, for themselves and for society. 
In conclusion, Richard Ashcroft claims that from a healthcare perspective, it is 
clearly unacceptable to coerce an autonomous adult into treatment, by contrasting the 
treatment with a prison sentence. He coins the pivotal question in this way: "Would 
the addict make the same choice if he or she were not in this situation?" (Ashcroft et 
al. 2006 p. 445) However, as this section has shown, ignoring the circumstances in 
which the offer is made leads to absurd conclusions. When the line of thought from 
the above quote is projected on to a normal healthcare situation, the absurdity is 
revealed: 
"By analogy, it would be absurd to hold that a person who is suffering from a 
serious disease and who is offered a risky operation cannot validly consent to 
this simply because he would ideally prefer not to suffer from the disease at 
all."(Ryberg 2012 p. 236) 
 
Conclusions on paternalistic objections 
In the first part of this section, we saw how to an extreme version of the brain-disease 
model for addiction, the coercive offer of an anti-drug vaccine will not be acceptable. 
The reason behind this is that according to this view, addicts have their autonomy 
impaired by their addiction to such a degree that it would be morally unacceptable to 
punish them. Asking them to make a treatment decision would be wrong because 
they are not considered able to make treatment decisions. To a more moderate 
version of the brain disease model, the offer would be acceptable, since it views 
addicts as having their autonomy only somewhat impaired by addiction. Thus, they 
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are able to make decisions, but it is also possible to exert them to a mild degree of 
coercive circumstances without it being a case of hard paternalism. From any version 
of the brain disease model, a reason to coerce or mandate addicts into treatment for 
their own good is to take some of the addicts’ remaining autonomy away (by 
coercion) in order to create more of it, by curbing their addiction. 
To the liberal view of addiction, any coercive treatment is hard paternalism. 
Whether this is acceptable is a separate discussion. I have shown examples of 
proponents of the liberal view that favor hard-paternalistic treatment of addicts 
(Foddy & Savulescu 2010) and examples that condemn such treatment. (Tännsjö 
1999) 
Torbjörn Tännsjö objects to offers such as the one proposed here, for the reason 
that autonomous persons must never be treated against their will, not even for their 
own good. This objection has very little bite in the case discussed here, since the 
persons in the case considered here are in a situation in which their special interest in 
their own well-being and their privileged epistemological position to themselves is 
already being set aside by being convicted to prison 
Most importantly, the price paid by being put in a coercive situation is very small 
compared to the fact that addicts get a choice, and that such a choice may help them 
out of drug abuse. 
All this does not matter if any exchange of punishment and care or treatment is 
not allowed. Tännsjö thinks that such an exchange is not allowed because no person 
should be coercively treated if the reason is not completely paternalistic, and no 
autonomous person should be coercively treated for paternalist reasons. The 
objection fails in this case, because even if we do risk harming the person we aim to 
help (while reducing crime), then they will be harmed in any case by incarceration. 
That the healthcare system will lose its reputation is not a problem, since the case in 
question here takes place in a system where coercion is an integral part, the criminal 
justice system. 
The objection that the coercive element compromises all treatment is an empirical 
claim which can be contested. One claim is likely though: to be less effective at 
cleaning people up than incarceration, it would have to very ineffective. 
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Including manipulation into the definition of coercion, and hence making the 
concept hinge on the intention of the coercer and not the experience of the coercee, 
makes it likely that Tännsjö's own alternative (early release in return for being 
considered less dangerous after taking an anti-drug vaccine ) is coercive. This 
disqualifies it by his own claims against coercion mentioned above. 
The claim that society is not in a position to judge persons who choose not to give 
up their addiction to illicit drugs despite being offered an anti-drug vaccine, is better 
aimed at a discussion about the legal status of such drugs, rather than to disqualify a 
coerced anti-drug vaccine offer in a society where the drugs in question are already 
illegal. 
It is unclear why Bomann-Larsen claims that the state is not in a position to make 
a coerced offer of medical treatment if the offer exceeds the crime that the person has 
been convicted of, because it is somehow not the state’s business. It may just as well 
be that it is the state’s business to reduce crime, and offers like the anti-drug vaccine 
would hence be legitimate. 
Claiming that the offer discussed here should not be given because the convicted 
person cannot consent to it, because of the coercive circumstances, is as absurd as 
not offering a seriously ill person a risky operation, because if she could choose 
freely, she would prefer not to be ill. 
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Part 2: For the good of society and justice 
Objections from theories of penal justice 
 
Even if there are no valid autonomy-related reasons why the drug- vaccine should 
not be offered, there may still be objections to its use. One group of objections have 
as their outset the good of society and justice. These are objections which claim that 
the anti-drug vaccine is unacceptable as part of penal justice systems in liberal 
democracies. This because an anti-drug vaccine, whether viewed as punishment or as  
treatment to replace punishment, is inconsistent with the reasons society has for 
punishing. These reasons do of course vary depending on which theory of penal 
justice is considered. 
The first part of this section examines two different objections based on a 
deontological view of punishment. One is the objection that coerced use of drug 
vaccinations used with the aim of reducing crime is unacceptable because it treats the 
criminal solely as a means. The other is the retributivist objection that the use of an 
anti-drug vaccine does not live up to the ideal of just deserts. 
The second part deals with a scenario designed to consider an objection from a 
consequentialist view of punishment, which holds that the vaccine should not be 
offered if there is no chance of it reducing crime.  
 
Are anti-drug vaccinations treating people solely as 
means? 
It can be claimed that it is not acceptable to punish using an anti-drug vaccine, if the 
intention behind this practice is that it gains society by reducing crime. The reason 
for this is that the addicted individual is used solely as a means to better society. The 
theory behind this objection is deontological and it refers to the moral constraint 
against treating persons solely as means, and not as ends in themselves: "If every 
individual is seen to have an intrinsic value, then his or her rights should not be 
sacrificed solely in order to protect others. From this perspective, the justification of 
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coerced treatment on crime prevention grounds is highly problematic in ethical 
terms." (Seddon 2007 p.275) To a deontologist this objection would be a reason to 
abandon coerced treatment, since treating someone solely as a means is prohibited. 
However, even if one accepts that people should not be treated solely as means, this 
objection is problematic. 
This is because it is not clear that making such an offer is in fact treating the 
convicted addict solely as a means. It is true, that by offering an anti-drug vaccine, 
the state would be treating the convicted addicts as means to the end of crime 
prevention, but not solely as a means. ‘Solely’ is the crucial term here. Using other 
people partly as means is not only allowed, but an integral part of our social lives. 
This applies even for deontologists, who otherwise would have grave difficulties 
engaging in basic transactions of capitalist economy, presenting role models to their 
children or being waited on in restaurants.  
For this objection to have any weight, it must be made clear how the use of an 
anti-drug vaccine is treating the convicted person solely as a means. Simply referring 
to the fact that they are being used as means of crime prevention will not do in itself, 
since crime prevention may just as well be sought in order to serve the ends of the 
convicted persons, as well as society’s. Also, since the problem here is crime 
prevention and crime prevention is an integral part of our justice system, for the 
objection to work it must be made clear how this particular type of punishment is 
somehow using the convicted persons solely as means, and other means of 
punishment are not. If not, the objection applies much broader than just the anti-drug 
vaccine, to any type of punishment used with the intention of reducing crime. 
 
Are anti-drug vaccinations cruel and unusual? 
A related objection is that any use of medical treatment is cruel and unusual 
punishment:  
"Compelling a prisoner, parolee or probationer to take a pharmacotherapy 
drug, assuming the person is not mentally incompetent or dangerous, is akin to 
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torture or barbarism. It treats the person as a means, rather than an end, and 
ought to be considered cruel and unusual punishment." (CCLE 2004 p.35)  
Note here that this objection applies to the offer suggested here, because the CCLE 
do not think there is a morally significant difference between compelling a prisoner 
and giving her a choice under coercive circumstances.  
Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by the Eight Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, and Article Five of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights State that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or to 
cruel or degrading treatment or punishment.”(UN 1948) The reason why this 
principle has been adopted is of course that it follows the intuitions of most people, 
that civilized societies should not torture people. Although moral rules such as this 
one are an integral part of the deontological view, and through history deontologists 
have accused utilitarians of being open to accepting cruelty and torture of individuals 
if it brings about better consequences for the many, (Rachels 1995) most utilitarians 
would also agree to this principle. An depth coverage of this discussion is not within 
the scope of this thesis. For the purpose of this discussion, it should suffice to 
mention that the standard utilitarian response to this is that in practice, allowing 
cruelty or torturous methods into the justice system will never bring about the best 
consequences since it will erode the trust in such a system. And the rare hypothetical 
cases where it might bring about the best consequences bear no resemblance to the 
cases considered in this thesis. 
Thus, if it can be shown that the coerced use of an anti-drug vaccine is in fact 
cruel or degrading or unusual (in a strictly negative sense of that word), it would 
constitute a serious objection to the use of such treatments, from an intuitive, a 
deontological and consequentialist understanding of justice. I have already shown 
that offering an anti-drug vaccine, either as punishment or instead of punishment can 
never be treating the convicted person solely as a means. I take torture, barbarism 
and cruelty to be in one and the same category and mean something along the lines 
of harming the convicted person disproportionately to the crime committed and not 
showing any respect for them as human beings. For this to be a compelling objection, 
it needs to be shown that it there is a significant risk that the treatment will in fact 
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result in such harm. The CCLE do this by referring to the side effects of any 
pharmacotherapy, and in particular the potential health risk of using new such 
treatments that are not tested properly. These two objections presuppose that the side 
effects of the anti-drug vaccine will make the treatment cruel, and convicted persons 
will be used as guinea-pigs to test treatment showing little respect for them as human 
beings. 
Taking on the latter objection first any anti-drug vaccine should undergo the same 
clinical trials as all other medicines do before they go on the market. As for the first 
objection, it may be true that all pharmacotherapies have side effects, but so does 
incarceration, both physical and mental, yet it is accepted as not cruel, barbaric or 
torturous. As for unusual, this is by definition true of anything new that is not exactly 
like the old. In this sense, drug-vaccinations will be unusual both as treatment and as 
punishment. However, if this is to be taken seriously as an objection, it needs to be 
shown that the new and unusual is also bad, or at least worse than the old. This 
remains to be shown.  
The next sections continue from the deontological view of punishment, by 
considering a number of objections based on the idea that punishment should give 
criminals what they deserve. 
  
Just deserts 
A retributivist view of punishment may object to using drug-vaccinations in the 
criminal justice system, by claiming that they fail to give criminals their deserved 
punishment. Retributivism is in the following understood as the legal theories which 
hold just deserts as the central reason for punishment or "the retributivist principle 
that the sole proper aim of punishment is to impose on the guilty the suffering they 
deserve." (Duff 2008) This view of justice implies that regardless of the positive 
effects of the anti-drug vaccine for both the addict and society, it may still be 
unacceptable from the view of justice. (Ryberg 2012) To put it bluntly, what matters 
is that justice is done, not that the criminals or society as such may benefit. Of the 
different retributivist theories, so-called positive retributivism is the one discussed in 
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this section. According to this theory, the criminal should be punished according to 
just deserts, no more or less. (Ryberg 2012, Duff 2008) 
Since what matters to a retributivist is that the criminal gets the punishment she 
deserves, replacing punishment with treatment is not an acceptable option, even if it 
brings about the best consequences. The question is then whether the anti-drug 
vaccine could indeed be viewed as punishment. For a sanction to qualify as a 
punishment, it must be a deliberate and intended hardship or harm. In modern forms 
of punishment this harm is usually brought about by impositions on the rights of the 
convicted offender. (Kleinig 2008) This can all be true of the anti-drug vaccine, 
among the rights imposed on by the vaccine are: the right to bodily integrity, the 
right to freedom from coercive circumstances, and the right to enjoy a certain drug. It 
must also be expressive, in such a way that it condemns the criminal act by imposing 
these hardships. (Kleinig 2008) Likewise, there is nothing in principle barring the 
anti-drug vaccine from playing this part. Thus, in the next section the anti-drug 
vaccine is considered a punishment which could partly or completely replace 
incarceration. 
Although it is established that the anti-drug vaccine can be viewed as a means of 
punishment, a retributivist may still claim that it does not live up to the justice's 
demand for just deserts. 
 
Are anti-drug vaccinations too harmful? 
A positive retributivist may object that the anti-drug vaccine provides either 
excessive or insufficient harm to the addict to be acceptable as punishment, for the 
reason that the addict would either suffer more or less than they deserve. (Ashcroft et 
al. 2006, Ryberg 2013, Douglas 2013,1&2) To positive (and negative) retributivism 
it is problematic if criminals are punished excessively, because this would mean that 
justice is not done. For this to be a problem for the drug-vaccination, it will have to 
be true that:  
1) The vaccine harms the convicted person excessively compared to incarceration.  
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2) The coercive circumstances under which the offer is made, can make the 
person choose the vaccination, even though it will subject her to excessive harm. 
If 1) is true, then 2) cannot be ruled out completely, since the case includes an 
autonomous person making her own choice. One may claim excessive harm is not a 
problem, as long as consent is valid. I have shown in this case that consent is valid. 
The claim would be that if people want to choose excessive harm, and they are 
competent to do so then they should be allowed to. However, considering that the 
choice is made under coercive circumstances, it will be the offer-giver's 
responsibility to make sure that either option will not subject the convicted person to 
excessive harm. If just deserts is what we are after, then I assume that it is the 
business of the justice system to decide what just deserts is, and hence to present 
choices that are not in excess of this. Presenting choices that are in excess of just 
deserts would be comparable to giving criminals an optional extra sentence, if they 
for reasons of remorse would want to punish themselves harder than their sentence. I 
take this to be unacceptable to a positive retributivist view of justice.   
As for 1) it is unlikely that a punishment consisting of only getting the anti-drug 
vaccine will be anywhere near as harmful to the convicted person, as any lengthy 
period of incarceration would be. In fact, it would have to quite harmful to the 
convicted person to compete with incarceration in this respect. Life in prison has 
been shown to be so detrimental to the inmates’ health and mental condition 
(UNODC, Douglas 2013,1) that it is hard to see how excessive harm can be a 
legitimate concern, when compared to incarceration. In fact, the opposite is more 
likely, as we shall see in the forthcoming section. 
 
Are anti-drug vaccinations not harmful enough? 
Even if punishing using an anti-drug vaccine will not result in too much harm being 
exerted on the convicted criminal, it may still be in conflict with the retributivist 
principle of just deserts by harming the addict insufficiently. This is an issue for 
positive retributivism, which interprets the retributivist principle in a way that 
downward deviations from the ideal level of punishment are unacceptable. 
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This seems to align well with the intuitions which we normally expect our justice 
system to satisfy, and indeed "retributivist thinking has dominated the penal theoretic 
field over the past three or four decades." (Ryberg 2012 p.238) As I have shown, it is 
unlikely that receiving an anti-drug vaccine will be anywhere near as harmful as 
lengthy periods of incarceration. Thus, I think it would clash with many people’s 
intuitions about justice if addicts who commit serious crimes such as murder or 
bodily assault, could simply choose to get an anti-drug vaccine, while non-addicted 
persons convicted of the same crimes would serve long prison sentences. The anti-
drug vaccine by itself would simply not be harmful enough to satisfy the principle of 
just deserts.  
There are, however, ways that this objection can be countered. One is to make the 
vaccination itself unpleasant. This could be done by adding something to the 
injections which gives some kind of inconvenient side effect. (Douglas 2013,2, 
Ryberg 2012) This would require that the retributivist accepts that one punishment 
can replace another, as long as the severity of the sanction is kept the same. (Ryberg 
2013) Another possibility is to give the addict the vaccine while in prison, and then 
shorten the sentence with a term which corresponds with the amount of 
inconvenience that the treatment has exerted on the convict. A third possibility is to 
combine the vaccine with some length of community service or probation. A fourth 
possibility is a combination of some or all of the above sanctions, together forming 
an equivalent amount of harm as a given period of incarceration. These combinations 
would require that retributivism can include not only replacement of sanctions but 
also combinations of sanctions, as long as the punishment's severity is kept at a 
constant level. This is possible within modern retributivism. (Ryberg 2012) 
Even if it is true that modern retributivism has no good reasons for not allowing 
different types of treatment, the question that remains is: Why should the state 
provide different types of punishment at all. A theory concerned solely with desert, 
need not necessarily be concerned with the positive consequences of the sanctions. If 
incarceration gives people what they deserve, and this is all that matters, a hardcore 
retributivist may ask: ‘Why bother if they get what they deserve?’  
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However, as long as "the penal bite" (Ryberg 2012, p.240) is guaranteed, modern 
retributivists may accept that future consequences do matter. Thus, such 
consequences as crime prevention and strengthening of the convicted person’s 
autonomy, may also play a part in which sanctions are made available in the system 
of penal justice. For this reason a retributivist may for example agree to a 
combination of the vaccination option and some length of community service, 
because they are equally severe, but may be better at reducing recidivism than 
incarceration and the uncomfortable vaccination. 
This section has shown, that in principle, a modern positive retributivist should 
have no problem accepting that an anti-drug vaccine could be offered as an 
alternative to incarceration. In practice, however, the retributivist and 
consequentialist theories of punishment may come into conflict concerning how 
harsh the vaccination alternative should be. In a situation where society is concerned 
with the consequences of the sanction, and wants the addicts to choose the 
vaccination over imprisonment, because of the aforementioned positive effects for 
both society and individuals, it may be viewed as a problem if no addicts were 
coerced into taking the vaccine. This would be unacceptable to retributivism, as it 
would mean that the convicted person who chooses the vaccination will be punished 
less severely, than deserved.  
This section has shown that retributive theories of justice, whether positive or 
negative, cannot object to the coerced offer of an anti-drug vaccine by claiming that 
it exerts insufficient or excessive harm on the convicted criminal7. Given the nature 
of the anti-drug vaccine compared to that of incarceration, it is highly unlikely that 
the vaccine will be as harmful as incarceration. As for concerns of excessive harm, 
                                                            
7 In criminal cases involving possession or consumption of drugs, a retributivist may even have a 
reason to prefer treatment with anti-drug vaccines to incarceration. 
"In this case, we may offer the addict who commits no further crimes the option of vaccination, 
along with other sanctions such as community service, since the wrong act is taking the drug, and this 
may therefore be the most appropriate level of punishment." (Ashcroft et al. 2006 p.445) 
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the vaccine can be combined with other sanctions to meet the objection of 
insufficient harm. 
Next, we turn to look at the claim that an anti-drug vaccine is unacceptable if it does 
not deter people from committing crimes. 
 
Deterrence 
An objection that can be raised from a consequentialist view of punishment is that 
providing criminals with the option of an anti-drug vaccine will not have same 
deterring effect as other means of punishment such as incarceration."If a criminal 
justice system is seeking to deter or prevent serious crime, it is unlikely that any 
addict would be ’offered’ the vaccine as an alternative to the sentencing option, 
because knowing that there is an alternative to prison would not deter drug misuse or 
drug-related crime." (Ashcroft et al. 2006, p.445) 
Intuitively, this objection can be relevant because avoiding prison is a good reason 
for not committing crimes. When we learn that should we be convicted we can 
choose something different, then the threat of punishment may not scare us away 
from committing crimes. This type of argument is also common in the debate over 
legalization of psychotropic drugs, that decriminalization will lead to many more 
people taking drugs because they will no longer be afraid of punishment.  
As an objection to the treatment offer, this intuition is problematic in a number of 
ways. First, it implies that the anti-drug vaccine does not harm the criminal nearly as 
much as incarceration, and thus can be countered in precisely the same way as the 
objection concerning just deserts. It is a matter of either making the vaccination 
unpleasant and/or combining it with other forms of punishment. 
One additional point concerning addiction and deterrence of drug-related crimes is 
that both the brain disease model and the liberal model of addiction acknowledge that 
some drug addictions provide their subjects with very strong temptations to take 
drugs. If they need to commit crimes to finance their drug abuse, this poses a serious 
challenge to any possible deterrent effect of the sanction. Considering all the other 
factors in a heavily addicted person's life that might deter her from taking drugs: 
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social stigma, personal and economic ruin etc., the alleged deterrent effect of a 
punishment would have to be very strong in order to tip the scale away from 
committing crimes. This is of course speculative, as it is hard to see how one can 
ever know anything about all the potential addicts that were deterred from taking 
drugs because they feared the threat of imprisonment, and subsequently are not in jail 
and not taking drugs.  
One way to further weaken this objection is a look at what increased incarceration 
has to offer when it come drug use:  
"Those countries that impose more severe penalties for personal possession and 
use have a larger number of drug users in prison, at a significant cost to the 
community. This approach does not appear to have a deterrent effect on drug 
use in the community, when compared to countries without severe sanctions 
for personal possession and use." (UNODC 2009 p.4-5) 
It may be argued that part of the idea of introducing a coerced choice of an anti-drug 
vaccine is to acknowledge that the deterrent effect of incarceration is dubious with 
regards to drug crimes. Instead, the focus is shifted and an alternative introduced, 
which aims to reduce the rates of recidivism instead, by dealing with the problem 
which lies at the root of the crimes committed, the problem of drug addiction:"One 
of the major justifications for drug treatment under coercion is that the alcohol and 
drug dependence of some offenders contributes to the commission of the offence 
with which they have been charged or convicted, and that treatment under coercion is 
an effective way of treating their drug dependence and thereby reducing the 
likelihood of their re-offending." (Hall 1997 p.3) Whether the anti-drug vaccine 
actually does reduce recidivism is of course an empirical question. 
The next section considers whether the vaccine can be justified in a case where it 
cannot be said to directly reduce crime. 
 
The case of the successful addict 
One important reason for introducing an anti-drug vaccine is that it will reduce 
crime, and that this crime reduction is advantageous for society, as well as for the 
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addicted individuals. An objection to the anti-drug vaccine could hold that in cases 
where there is no such crime reducing effect, it would not be acceptable to present 
this choice, because it has no positive effect for society. This section presents  a 
hypothetical case where the anti-drug vaccine works as it should, and the addict in 
question is eligible for the vaccine following the assumptions in the introduction, and 
her addiction is cured. Nevertheless, no crime reducing effect is gained, because the 
crime is not inherently connected to the addiction. The objection states that an addict 
can be such a well-functioning member of society that it is unacceptable to offer her 
the vaccine, because it does not benefit society.  
Picture a successful businessman with more money in the bank than he will ever 
be able to spend in his lifetime, on drugs or anything else. He is seriously addicted to 
cocaine, but manages his addiction by being able to keep a steady supply of the best 
quality and go to expensive rehab centers for detoxification when needed. He is 
arrested, tried, and convicted for some economic crime, and given a three year prison 
sentence. He admits to being addicted and medical personnel with the correct 
training agree that he is indeed sufficiently addicted be offered a vaccine and some 
length of community service and fines, in exchange for going to prison. For 
argument sake, I assume that his judgment regarding whether he should break the 
law was not affected by his addiction. 
In the courtroom next door, an unemployed heroin addict also receives a three 
year sentence for robbing a 7-Eleven in order to get cash for his next score. He is 
offered the same combination of sanctions. Clearly, his crime was motivated by his 
drug abuse. Is there a morally significant difference between making the offer in the 
two cases? 
I assume that it is more probable that an anti-drug vaccine will have a crime-
reducing effect in the second than in the first. Also, I conclude that the second case is 
clear-cut. When considering the consequences; he should be offered the anti-drug 
vaccine. 
It may be put forth here, that when it comes to society's gain from crime-
reduction, incarceration has one big short-term advantage over the anti-drug vaccine; 
the person is locked up. If the successful addict is given a vaccine and allowed back 
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into society, he may continue to commit economic crimes, while serving his 
community service. The vaccine does not prevent this, since his drug addiction did 
not cause him to break the law and it will not in the future either. In the second case, 
I assume that the addict will commit fewer crimes while vaccinated, because his 
crime was motivated by his addiction, where as if he receives no treatment while in 
prison, he is likely to reoffend once released.  
The vaccine should not be offered in cases where there is no gain for society. This 
is indeed such a case, since the successful addict will commit neither more nor less 
crime for the remainder of his life, whether he gets the vaccine or not. He could of 
course gain personally from being coerced into treatment, but if that is the sole 
reason, it is by definition no longer punishment but treatment. Even though both 
addicts are clinically-speaking sufficiently addicted to undergo this treatment, there 
is no good reason to use the vaccination as punishment in the case of the successful 
addict.This is of course not a reason to completely abandon the vaccine option, but 
may be a reason to introduce a ‘social criterium’ to the treatment. This could be that 
only persons who are sufficiently addicted, and in grave social distress can be offered 
the vaccine. This could be compared to present sentencing practices, where the 
convicted person's social circumstances are also considered when deciding on the 
length and nature of the sentence. 
 
Conclusion: objections from theories of penal justice 
This section has made it clear that a modern positive retributivist can accept the offer 
of an anti-drug vaccine. This is because there is no danger of inflicting excessive 
harm, since the vaccination is assumed to be relatively harmless by itself. Insufficient 
harm is also not a problem, as long as one accepts that different forms of punishment 
can be combined to add up to the amount of harm deserved by the convicted person. 
This makes it possible to combine the vaccine with other forms of punishment, such 
as community service or incarceration. Another possibility is to make the vaccine 
itself an unpleasant experience. 
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As for the deterrent effects of punishment, making sure the level of harm is not 
lower than what is necessary to prevent persons from committing crimes should meet 
that demand. Also the deterrent effects of incarceration in drug cases are 
questionable. Thus, the use of an anti-drug vaccine may indicate a step away from 
focus on deterrence and towards dealing with the underlying problem, which is drug 
addiction. 
From a consequentialist view of punishment, if the anti-drug vaccine can be 
proven to have no crime-preventing effect, then it should not be offered. This 
objection can be said to disqualify the anti-drug vaccine, but only in cases where it 
can be shown that there is in fact no chance of crime-reduction such as in the case of 
the successful addict. 
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Part 3: For the good of the convicts 
Objections from the rights of convicts 
This third and final part of the thesis will deal with a number of rights-based 
objections to the use of an anti-drug vaccine. These objections all share a claim that 
the use of an anti-drug vaccine is unacceptable because it is incompatible with the 
basic human rights of convicted persons. These are the intrusiveness objection, the 
objection from freedom of thought and the objection from authenticity. 
 
Is an anti-drug vaccine too intrusive? 
As we have seen, even though a vaccine such as the one suggested here is in many 
ways not as harmful as incarceration, it could still be unacceptable as punishment, 
because it is more intrusive. A premise for this objection is that a form of punishment 
can be more intrusive than another while being less harmful. (Douglas 2013,1) It is 
claimed that a pharmaceutical intervention such as the anti-drug vaccine is 
unacceptable because it is more intrusive than incarceration. Thus, it deprives the 
person of other human rights than incarceration does, and the deprivation of these 
rights makes the vaccine unacceptable. Intuitively, the idea of the state using its 
coercive force to intrude into a person’s body is disturbing; we like to believe that we 
control what enters our bodies. Such treatment bears resemblance to sci-fi scenarios 
of forced bodily implants or deviant thoughts being removed pharmaceutically. This 
section dissects this intuition to see if it is in fact a reasonable objection. 
By incarcerating someone, the state is depriving that person of her right to free 
movement and association. By giving the anti-drug vaccine, the state is depriving her 
of her right to bodily integrity. In order for the objection to work, it must be shown 
that it is acceptable for the state to infringe on the first set of rights, and not the 
second set. If this could be shown, then it could be claimed the state is using the 
coercive circumstances of the situation to attempt to make the addict choose a 
punishment which is in itself unacceptable. As I mentioned earlier, I do think that 
there are options that the state should not present the addict with. Humiliating and 
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irrelevant treatment would not be acceptable. For example to say ‘do your time or 
take a public spanking’. The offer should be of an alternative that would have 
positive consequences. 
However, even if we do assume that the anti-drug vaccine will have positive 
consequences for both society and the convicted individual, one may still object that 
offering anything that could make someone choose to waive their right to bodily 
integrity is unacceptable, regardless of its positive consequences. It is assumed here 
that prisoners somehow give up some of their rights by committing certain crimes, 
making it acceptable for the state to treat them differently than law-abiding citizens. 
(Douglas 2013,2) One way the state treats criminals differently is by depriving them 
of their right to movement and association through incarceration; another way could 
be by depriving them of their right to bodily integrity or freedom from bodily 
intrusion. 
The question is whether there is a significant difference between which crimes 
would make it acceptable for the state to respond using incarceration, and which 
crimes it could respond to by drug-vaccinating its citizens. The question can be 
framed in terms of how robust ones rights are. The robustness of one’s rights is 
measured by the modal distance one needs to travel from the actual world, to the 
world where the right loses its force. (Douglas 2013,1) For the right to bodily 
integrity to be more robust than the right to free movement and association, it would 
require that a person should commit worse crimes to lose the right to bodily integrity, 
than to lose the right to free movement and association. The right may even be so 
robust that no crime could challenge its robustness. An example of this type of 
objection is seen in the debate over capital punishment. The objection is that no 
crime (not even murder) is so horrible that it should render the loss of one’s right to 
live. (Amnesty International 2007) 
Is the right to bodily integrity more robust than the right to free movement and 
association? To settle this, it may be helpful to view people's rights as protecting 
their interests. (Douglas 2013,2) If so the question is which interests would we rather 
have violated? The interest in being able to move around freely and socialize with 
who we want or the interest in being free from getting a relatively harmless injection 
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a few times a year? Intuitively, this is not a hard choice, the vaccine in question does 
not violate any more robust interests than incarceration. It is no more harmful in 
terms of loss of welfare, and compared to the wide array of interests frustrated by 
incarceration, which include many other rights being denied (depending on the 
prison of course), it must be said to be very lenient.  
To conclude this section, the intrusiveness objection fails because it is impossible 
to identify what it is that makes the right to bodily integrity a more robust right than 
the rights of free movement and association. 
Even if bodily freedom from bodily intrusion is not a valid objection to the anti-
drug vaccine, the fact that it intrudes into and changes people's minds may be, that is 
the topic of the next three sections. 
 
Changing minds 
One line of objections which deserves attention stems from the intuition that there is 
something wrong about methods of punishment, or coerced treatment alternatives, 
that work by affecting the mind directly. I think many would agree that there is 
something intuitively frightening about the state tampering with people's minds. Also 
interfering with the mind can seem worse than interfering with the body. Most 
people would probably prefer losing a limb or two to losing their mind in some 
serious way (even though neither could of course be of much use without the other). 
This next section takes a closer look at what lies behind this intuition, and whether it 
will provide a good reason for not introducing the anti-drug vaccine. 
Before proceeding it should be noted that vaccines of the type suggested here may 
not end up working directly on the brain. Many of the vaccines that are being tested 
work by eliminating the psychoactive drugs before they enter the brain. (Hall 2002, 
Carter & Hall 2012) Nevertheless, there are also drugs being tested that do target the 
brain. (Carter & Hall 2012)  
The 'red flag' of intuition towards this type of treatment is waved by Martha Farah 
in the following passage:  
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"What moral intuition triggers this flag? Primarily an intuition about individual 
freedom, of a kind that we have not previously denied even to prisoners: the 
freedom to think one’s own thoughts and have one's own personality. In anger 
management class, a person is free to think, ‘This is stupid. No way am I going 
to use these methods.’ In contrast, the mechanism by which Prozac curbs 
impulsive violence cannot be accepted or resisted in the same way." (Farah 
2004 p.8) 
The moral intuition that Farah describes is directly transferable to coerced addiction 
treatment. A closer look at the quote above reveals three different objections. The 
first is that as the treatment works directly on the mind, one cannot object to the 
treatment once it is chosen. The second is that the right to freedom of thought is a 
basic human right which provides the foundation for other rights such as freedom of 
speech, and thus coerced medical interference with the mind is wrong. The third has 
to do with authenticity, that it is wrong to change people's personalities, because it 
somehow makes them less themselves.  
The first objection can be quite easily set aside, the second and third warrant some 
more attention. The first objection is disqualified by the simple observation, that 
making binding choices is an integral part of human life. (Ryberg 2012) This 
includes undergoing surgery, having children and (if you get caught) committing a 
crime that will send you to prison. Once you choose to do it, getting out again is 
either practically impossible or psychologically extremely difficult. Also, these cases 
are even harder to reverse than anti-drug vaccines. It is even highly likely that these 
vaccines will be reversible in the sense that upholding the immunization against the 
drug in question will most likely require regular injections a few times a year, this of 
course makes the objection even weaker.  
The second objection states that direct manipulation of the brain is unacceptable, 
because it threatens freedom of thought, and that this is a problem, because our 
freedom of thought is a more basic right than other rights: 
"Without freedom of thought, freedom of speech is moot. You cannot express 
what you cannot think. Likewise, you can only express what you can think. 
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Chemical manipulation of the brain, therefore, could become the ultimate prior 
restraint on speech." (CCLE 2004 p.37)  
This seems like a serious objection; thought control is something which most people 
would shun, and direct thought control of convicts sounds like something taken out 
of A Clockwork Orange. If the use of an anti-drug vaccine violates the convict’s 
right to freedom of thought in any significant way, then it would be a very good 
reason indeed not to introduce it.  
I assume that the vaccination in question does not have serious side effects; 
including major changes in the mental life not connected to the addiction. However, 
if the vaccine is designed in such a way that it removes the desire to take a certain 
drug, for example, it could be claimed that the person receiving it is no longer free to 
think ‘I want heroin!’ (and mean it) and as a result of this is not able to express her 
thought with conviction (though she is of course still able to say the words ‘I want 
heroin’, but since he does not, she is faking it). Is this morally acceptable? 
Part of the answer is comparable to the intrusiveness objection. The question is 
whether our right to freedom from intrusion into our mind is more robust than other 
freedoms that incarceration takes away from us? The answer to this is that it will be a 
question of degrees of importance of the various parts of one's mental life. If the anti-
drug vaccine only limits the addict's desire for the addictive drug, this part of the 
mental life would often be considered unwanted, and at most be considered 
peripheral. In this case it can be dismissed for the same reason that the intrusiveness 
objection is dismissed. (Douglas 2013,1) This is of course because the right to want 
heroin is not a very robust right, compared to the right to for example freedom of 
movement: 
"It seems to me doubtful whether the interest that we have in being free from 
interference with such peripheral aspects of our mental life is more important 
that the interest we have in being permitted to engage in the kinds of free 
movement and association that are ruled out by incarceration." (Douglas 
2013,1 p.14) 
If the anti-drug vaccine would function in a way that took away all desires, one 
might plausibly argue that this would be a more robust right than those removed by 
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incarceration, and coercing persons into taking such a treatment would be highly 
morally dubious.  
It makes a difference whether the vaccination is viewed as a punishment or as a 
treatment which replaces punishment. As this section has shown, peripheral changes 
in the addicts mind, such as not being able to want a particular addictive drug, cannot 
be said to deprive the convicted person of rights that are significantly worse than 
those taken away by incarceration. Viewed as treatment, this objection is no more 
compelling if direct change of the brain is equivalent to depriving persons of their 
right to freedom of thoughts. If consent is valid, then any treatment using for 
example anti-depressants would be unacceptable for the same reason. In this view it 
is better to have one's right to depressive thoughts than to have them changed by 
using pharmaceuticals. This runs contrary to many intuitions on the subject, I think. 
Built in to this concern with the freedom of thought is an implicit concern that 
engaging in the use of coerced manipulation of the brain means embarking on a 
slippery slope towards state mind control of deviating persons. This is a vital concern 
if it is likely, but as with all slippery slope objections it must be shown that there is a 
genuine risk that introducing an anti-drug vaccine also leads to mind control of 
deviants; this remains to be shown. 
 
Vaccinated from authenticity  
The third objection concerned with directly changing of minds, is that the use of 
psychopharmacological treatment may threaten the authenticity of the person. This is 
a concern that Farah (2004) shares with Torbjörn Tännsjö: "If [the addiction 
treatment] drastically changes the personality of the drug addicted clients/patients, 
this may be problematic in itself. It may be even more problematic when coercion is 
added to the cure. This would come close to the coercive exchange of certain people 
for other people." (Tännsjö 1999 p.136) Even though Tännsjö himself has no 
problem with exchanging himself for another person better suited to live a good life 
than him, he acknowledges that this is something that many people would fear, and 
that introducing such a scheme of coercively exchanging persons would be a 
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problem, in that it would ruin people's trust in society's institutions. (Tännsjö 1999) 
Intuitively this is of course a serious concern; the right to be who we are should be a 
very robust right, and if the anti-drug vaccine would change persons away from their 
authentic selves in any significant way it may be reason to abandon such an offer, 
both for the sake of individuals and society’s institutions. 
I want to make a few remarks to the exchanging persons claim, before considering 
objections based on more moderate appeals to loss of authenticity. First, in order to 
know when a person is exchanged for another person one would need some 
exhaustive definition of what a person is, and what and how much of this personality 
can be changed before we should speak of a new person. This discussion is not 
within the scope of this thesis, mainly because the vaccination in question is assumed 
not to have an effect anywhere near what I intuitively perceive as the exchange of 
persons for other persons. If it did, I would agree with Tännsjö that regardless of 
some individuals being content with being exchanged for other persons, the general 
effect on the level of trust in society's institutions would make such a coerced 
treatment scheme unacceptable.  
Even without exchanging persons for new persons, punishing or replacing prison 
time with treatment, using pharmacological changes in certain personality traits (in 
this case drug addiction) may still be considered unacceptable for reasons of 
authenticity. The concern is that the addict's authenticity is threatened if she is 
coerced into accepting treatment which either changes her personality, or conflicts 
with her core values and the way she has formed herself. (Ryberg 2012)  
To start with, even if the mental changes brought on by an anti-drug vaccine can 
be said to change the addict's personality, it is unlikely that personality changes are 
by themselves enough to disqualify an anti-drug vaccine as punishment or treatment. 
This is because our personalities change over time, and these personality changes are 
not usually considered a negative thing, some are even considered a duty for us to 
perform, as we mature. (Ryberg 2012)  
If one takes the essentialist view of authenticity, claiming that we have one set 
personality and that pharmacological changes in this are objectionable, the objection 
practically refutes itself. Although there is much debate on the genetic component of 
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being disposed for acquiring an addiction, it is always a self-acquired personality 
trait, to some extent . The personality has already been changed by becoming 
addicted to the drug; this is a change that the person has brought onto themselves. No 
one are born as using addicts. All addicts have chosen to change their brain through 
taking drugs. Changing the addictive personality using an anit-drug vaccine cannot 
be wrong because it makes the person less authentic, when the ‘original’ personality 
trait that is changed was itself drug-induced. If it is a change of personality from 
addiction to not being addicted which makes the anti-drug vaccination problematic 
the problem, and if we agree that consent is valid, then this objection should apply to 
any rehab attempts, so that any successful attempt to get off drugs is morally wrong 
because it renders the person inauthentic. This is of course absurd. 
A proponent of the liberal view of addiction may defend an existential view of 
authenticity, by claiming that choosing to stay addicted is an authentic choice like 
any other, and that it reflects the person’s values. In a treatment context, this is 
consistent within that view of addiction, but having shown that consent is valid in 
this case, the person's authentic choice to take the vaccine must overrule this. 
However, even if one accepts this account of addiction and authenticity (and denies 
consent), it does not disqualify an anti-drug vaccine as a means of punishment. All 
penal alternatives will deny the convicted persons their ability to fully develop their 
personalities and will affect their values, both intentionally by the communicative 
element of punishment and as a side effect. For example, coerced cognitive therapy 
is intended to change personalities and incarceration is known to change people’s 
personalities, often not for the better. 
A further counter-objection to the understanding of addicts from the liberal view 
of addiction as embracing their addiction as an authentic part of themselves, is that 
this is typically not how it is experienced. On the contrary, as we have seen in the 
introduction, the behavioral definition of addiction includes that the person is unable 
to refrain from taking drugs, despite attempts to do so. This situation is similar to the 
situation where people suffering from mental disorders such as lack of impulse 
control and depression do not experience their behavior as authentically their own. 
(Ryberg 2012) As with addiction, the behavior is not a result of a choice which 
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shapes the person in a certain desirable authentic way, it is rather a compulsive-type 
behavior, which in turn is a result of a previous choice to take drugs. Note that this 
description fits with all three views of addiction addressed in this thesis. Even a 
liberal account of addiction does not necessarily rule out that the addiction cannot be 
experienced as inauthentic, merely that this it is not a disease but a strong desire 
similar to other desires. Often addicts refer to their behavior as ‘that's the drugs 
talking’, ‘the drugs taking control over their lives’ and getting clean is like ‘getting 
their life back’. 
I have shown here, that objections from authenticity do not suffice as objections to 
the coerced offer of an anti-drug vaccine. This is because changes in personality are a 
fact of human life and even obligatory in some cases. Thus, the alternatives to the 
vaccine, such as other types of treatment and incarceration have also (either as 
intended or as a side effect) changed the subject’s personality. For argument’s sake, 
even if we do assume that an addict's authenticity can be threatened by being treated 
for addiction, this seems to counter with the fact that most addicts feel that it is the 
addiction that is inauthentic, at least some of the time.   
 
Loss of self-knowledge 
If other sanctions such as incarceration and cognitive therapy also change the 
subjects’ personalities, and these changes are not even objectionable, the 
objectionable quality of a vaccine may be that it works directly on the brain. The 
claim that lies underneath this type of objection is that there is something wrong with 
a treatment which merely treats the condition directly, such as pharmacologic 
treatments. By ‘just’ giving the addict a drug to treat the drug addiction, she is 
deprived of important lessons about her own inner life, that other forms of treatment 
(or hitting rock bottom and going cold turkey) could teach her. Thus, the anti-drug 
vaccine may be effective in combating the addiction, but the person remaining is less 
wise about the causes of her addiction and other self- knowledge than she could have 
been, had she been coerced into taking another way out, or had she quit without 
treatment. 
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We can test our intuitions on the subject by asking if we would react differently if 
it were a question of indirect change of mind. Suppose some miraculous cognitive 
therapy could remove the desire to take drugs by having a session every three 
months. I assume that few would object to this as a form of punishment because it 
rendered the person inauthentic. So the problem is clearly not that the person's mind 
is changed, and her freedom of thought is somehow infringed upon by her not being 
able to want the drug, but rather that the change is achieved using pharmaceuticals.  
One suggestion as to what the problem may be with such a treatment is that "...it 
is a type of intervention that simply bypasses the treated person’s rational 
capacities." (Ryberg 2012, p.233) The downside of this bypassing is supposed to be 
that the person is deprived of reasons to change and self-knowledge. However, this is 
not a sufficient reason to abandon the anti-drug vaccine, for the following reasons: 
First, we may ask, "what does it mean to obtain understanding?" (Ryberg 2012, 
p.234). If the cause of the persons addiction is that her receptors the brain are so 
oversensitive to the rush of cocaine that everything else fades in the background, and 
she experiences being completely taken over by a desire to do nothing more than do 
more coke, then what more of an explanation is needed?  
Second, it is of course plausible that drug addiction has a strong social element to 
it, and that addiction cannot be explained using a purely biological explanation. This 
objection has some weight to it, if it is understood as a warning against using mass-
vaccinations as a cheap alternative to solving the social problems which lead many 
people living under desperate conditions into drug abuse. However, the risk that it 
may be used too much is not in itself a reason to abandon a successful punishment or 
treatment. It may also be counter-objected that in some cases a vaccine may be just 
what is needed to gain the strength to do something about these social conditions, 
apply for a job, take better care of one's children, start a revolution etc. 
Third, in the narrow context of the coerced offer of a vaccine in exchange for 
probation, we must look at the alternatives. Considering the amount of drug use in 
and after an average prison term, I think it is safe to say that incarceration neither 
cleans victims up, nor provides them with much knowledge of their drug-problem. 
Whether cognitive therapy does this is an empirical question, but there may be very 
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good reasons to combine vaccinations with voluntary cognitive treatment, which is 
of course not ruled out by the proposal made in this thesis. 
 
Conclusion: Objections from the rights of convicts 
Summing up this section, I have shown that the intrusiveness objection fails because 
it is impossible to identify what it is that makes the right to bodily integrity a more 
robust right than the rights of free movement and association. The objection from 
freedom of thought is not compelling. This is because, when the anti-drug vaccine is 
viewed as punishment, it cannot be shown that the right to having peripheral and 
even unwanted thoughts is not a more robust right than other rights violated by 
incarceration. If it is viewed as treatment to replace punishment, then, since consent 
is valid, rejecting the anti-drug vaccine because it takes away addictive thoughts 
would be like refusing to give people anti-depressants because they violate people's 
right to depressive thoughts, which I take to be absurd. 
That a coerced choice of an anti-drug vaccine threatens the authenticity of a 
person enough to abandon the vaccine is not likely. First, given that consent is valid, 
the choice of the person must be viewed as an authentic one. Second, even if this is 
denied, then personality changes are an integral part of human life. Third, changing a 
value (addiction) achieved by taking a drug by using another drug can hardly be said 
to make the person less herself than before, since the initial change was also achieved 
pharmacologically. Fourth, addicts typically do not experience their addicted selves 
as being authentic. The fact that the use of pharmacological treatment on addiction 
should be abandoned because the addicts miss out on some deeper understanding of 
themselves, is doubtful unless we know what knowledge that could be, and even if it 
is true to some extent, the drug vaccine may also provide the peace of mind that 
could make it possible for an addict to re-think her life.   
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Non-moral objections 
This is a philosophy thesis, written within the field of applied ethics. It is not within 
the scope of the argument presented to decide empirical or practical issues, but 
normative ones. There are however, two objections or more correctly two groups of 
related objections that are so common to the discussion of coerced addiction 
treatment (and which in many ways are weighty), that this thesis would not be 
complete unless they are briefly mentioned. 
The first is a group of objections, which basically claim that any use of coerced 
drug treatment means that society is embarking on a slippery slope which will 
eventually cause irreparable damage to the virtues of liberal societies. The concern is 
that governmental misuse of a coerced vaccination scheme will eventually lead to the 
practice being expanded so that the anti-drug vaccine will lead to such things as 
mandated treatment, treatment of non-criminals, mass drug vaccinations of selected 
groups of society and deviance control. (Wild et al. 2012, Tännsjö 1999, CCLE 
2004) 
This must be recognized as a serious objection, if it can be shown that such a 
development is probable. The argument is a slippery slope argument, and as with all 
such arguments, the proponents need to show that there is a substantial risk that 
introducing one thing will lead to another. I have yet to see a compelling example of 
this. Until then, I think it is reasonable to claim that because there is some risk that a 
successful treatment may be over used, is not a reason not to use it, but to regulate it 
carefully. 
Another concern is that with the introduction of a drug vaccine, social and 
psychological aspects of addiction will be ignored, and addicts will be left in the 
sometimes deplorable mental and social conditions that serve as the backdrop for 
many addictions. (Ashcroft & Franey 2004, Carter & Hall 2012 p.98) The UNODC 
has as part of their guidelines for good practice in drug treatment referrals described 
how this problem should be alleviated: "Emergency social support, response to basic 
needs, such as food, shelter, hygienic measures and clothes, should accompany 
community based treatment approaches. Primary social support provides adequate 
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shelter, alleviates poverty and is an essential complimentary intervention to facilitate 
the contact with drug dependent individuals, allowing them to attend treatment 
programmes and to take care of their overall health. Furthermore sustainable 
livelihoods interventions might be necessary, such as provision of vocational skills or 
alternative education, access to income generation, micro-credit and career 
counselling." (UNODC 2009) This discussion is important, but from the view of 
normative ethics, if addicts are treated badly by not having their social issues 
attended to, then that is the moral problem, not the use of an anti-drug vaccine as 
such. 
The second group of concerns are some important practical problems which also 
need to be addressed if the scheme of drug-vaccinations is to be successful, two of 
them are as follows:  
First, how to avoid that the users do not switch drugs and continue their addiction 
with another drug than the one they have been vaccinated against. (Hall & Carter 
2004) Because many addicts are also addicted to more than one drug at a time; the 
risk is that they may simply shift away from the drug they have been vaccinated 
against, and continue using other drugs This could be helped by designing vaccines 
that cover more drugs, but in any case it is an important concern. 
Secondly, there is considerable danger to the individual in the fact that addicts are 
prone to overdose after periods of abstinence. Especially heroin users have a high 
mortality after longer periods of abstinence due to decreased tolerance. This is also a 
serious concern, but not one that should refute the entire drug-vaccination scheme, 
since this is also a problem with incarceration, at least in facilities where inmates are 
kept relatively drug-free.  
Third and last it should be mentioned that there are also those who are not so 
optimistic about whether such an anti-drug vaccine will ever work in the way 
assumed in this thesis. (Fry 2012, Hall 2006, Kalant 2010, Carter & Hall 2009)  
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Conclusions 
Considered as a paternalist intervention, the offer of an anti-drug vaccine under 
coercive circumstances is received very differently, depending on which view of 
addiction one takes. For an extreme version of the disease view, holding that addicts 
are rarely or never autonomous agents in the sense that they are unable to make any 
type of treatment decisions, the offer is not an option. This is due to the fact that 
punishment of people with seriously impaired autonomy is not morally acceptable, as 
is the case with persons suffering from serious mental illness. Additionally, from this 
point of view, presenting addicts with a choice is at best redundant. On this view, the 
only morally acceptable way for the state to deal with addicted persons is mandated 
treatment with the aim of reinstating their autonomy. This view is not very common, 
and has some weighty empirical objections against it. 
If one accepts that it is consistent to have a view of addiction, where the addict is 
considered autonomous, but is also suffering from a brain disease (which impairs 
skills such as the ability to plan ahead), the offer is morally acceptable. Seen from 
this view the aim of the treatment will be to strengthen addict autonomy through the 
coercive choice. 
From the liberal view of addiction, any coercion is a case of hard paternalism. 
Considering the situation of the convicted person facing incarceration, the 
coercive nature of the offer does not undermine valid consent, as that would be 
comparable to not offering a person suffering from a serious illness a risky operation, 
because if she could choose freely, she would rather not be suffering from the illness 
at all. The special circumstances of having to make a choice between prison and 
treatment are also what causes the claim that autonomous persons must never be 
treated against their will, not even for their own good, to lose its bite here. For even 
if we do not accept that consent is valid, then the persons in the case considered here 
are in a situation in which both their special interest in their own well-being and their 
privileged epistemological position to themselves are already being set aside by 
being convicted to a prison sentence. The price paid by being put in a coercive 
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situation is very small compared to the fact that they get a choice, and that such a 
choice may help them out of their drug abuse. 
That punishment and care or treatment can never be exchanged or mixed, because 
we may hurt the persons we say we want to help is not a convincing objection, since 
in this situation they will be harmed anyway. That the healthcare system will lose its 
reputation is not a problem, since this takes place in a different system, where as 
coercion is an integral part of the criminal justice system. 
The general conclusion to the section on paternalism is that from the views of 
addiction which hold that addicts are capable of making such choices, there are 
strong paternalist reasons to offer an anti-drug vaccine to convicted addicts, and that 
none of the objections manage to change this picture. This is mainly due to the fact 
that the offer is a very mild form of paternalism, in that the person is presented with a 
choice, and no extra negative consequences are added, should she refuse, making it 
at most a very mild case of hard paternalism.  
From the section on objections from theories of penal justice is concluded that a 
modern positive retributivist can accept the offer of an anti-drug vaccine. This is 
because there is no danger of inflicting excessive harm, since the vaccination is 
assumed to be relatively harmless. Insufficient harm is also not a problem, as long as 
one accepts that different forms of punishment can be combined to add up to the 
amount of harm deserved by the convicted person. This makes it possible to combine 
the vaccine with other forms of punishment, such as community service or 
incarceration. Another possibility is to make the vaccine itself an unpleasant 
experience. These methods could also meet the demand for deterrence. Even so, the 
use of an anti-drug vaccine may indicate a step away from focusing on deterrence 
and towards dealing with the underlying problem, which is drug addiction. 
A consequentialist would be right to object that if the anti-drug vaccine has no 
crime-preventing effect, then it should not be offered. In such cases, the anti-drug 
vaccine would be disqualified, in the sense that there would be no reason to present 
it. 
The section on objections from the rights of prisoners has shown that the 
intrusiveness objection fails because it is impossible to identify what it is that makes 
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the right to bodily integrity a more robust right, than the rights of free movement and 
association. The objection from freedom of thought is not compelling either. If the 
anti-drug vaccine is viewed as punishment, the right to having peripheral and even 
unwanted thoughts is not a more robust right than other rights violated by 
incarceration. If it is viewed as treatment to replace punishment, then, since consent 
is valid, rejecting the anti-drug vaccine because it removes addictive thoughts would 
be like refusing to give people anti-depressants because they deprive them of their 
right to depressive thoughts, which I take to be absurd. 
That a coerced choice of an anti-drug vaccine threatens the authenticity of a 
person enough to abandon the vaccine is not likely. First, given that consent is valid, 
the choice of the person must be viewed as an authentic choice. Second, even if this 
is denied, then personality changes are an integral part of human life. Third, 
changing a value (addiction) achieved by taking a drug, using another drug can 
hardly be said to make the person less herself than before, since the initial change 
was also achieved pharmacologically. Fourth, addicts typically do not experience 
their addicted selves as being authentic. The fact that the use of pharmacological 
treatment on addiction should be abandoned because the addicts miss out on some 
deeper understanding of themselves, is doubtful unless we know what knowledge 
that could be. Even if it is true to some extent, the anti-drug vaccine may also 
provide the peace of mind that could make it possible for an addict to re-think her 
life. 
I conclude that none of the moral objections to the offer of an anti-drug vaccine, 
that I have considered, are successful in disqualifying that the offer could be made. 
The one exception is in cases where it is certain that the crime had nothing to do with 
the addiction, and so no crime preventing-effect is possible. Here the offer should not 
be made. 
I am not claiming that there cannot be serious practical and policy-making 
objections to introducing such an offer, and that they may cause it not to be 
implemented. Practically, there is the problem of pharmacology being used too 
eagerly to attempt to solve problems that should be solved by other means, such as 
the social problems that lie at root of addiction. Because there is a risk that a 
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successful treatment will be used in the wrong way does not in itself constitute a 
sufficient reason for abandoning the treatment, however. There is also the concern 
that states will embark on a slippery slope from mild coercion of criminal offenders 
to mandated treatment of deviant behavior. However important this concern, as of 
yet it remains to be shown that there is a real risk that this will happen. 
Since none of the moral objections are convincing, then provided the practical and 
social issues can be resolved, there should be nothing to ban an anti-drug vaccine 
from being offered to convicted persons in exchange for some of or their entire 
prison sentence. 
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Perspectives 
The possibility of coerced use of an anti-drug vaccine opens up some interesting 
perspectives on the role of drug use in society, beyond simply using it as an 
alternative in the existing public approach to drugs. The anti-drug vaccine may be a 
tool in what the UNODC refers to as "[m]oving from a sanction-oriented approach to 
a health-oriented one."(UNODC 2009 p.2) This can of course mean many things, but 
if one favors a policy of legalizing currently illicit psychotropic drugs, the anti-drug 
vaccine could prove to be a valuable tool in managing such a scheme. 
The use of the anti-drug vaccine like the one presented does not have to be 
constrained to illegal drugs. Since the use is not limited to purely drug-related 
crimes, it could be used both for paternalist and society-beneficient reasons in a 
society where more psychotropic drugs were legal. For example in a society where 
people were allowed to use many of the drugs that are illegal in most countries today, 
and and thus some of the vast resources spent on fighting drugs were instead spent on 
helping those who are not able to control their drug use. The combination of 
decriminalization and widespread use of an anti-drug vaccine could be supported 
from all views of addiction except perhaps the moral or lay view. From the brain 
disease view, it should be obvious that it is better both morally and practically to 
treat people suffering from a disease instead of punishing them. From the liberal 
view it could be stated that people should be allowed to choose drugs, if they wish to 
do so, for both moral and practical reasons. "Dealing with the drug problem is 
decriminalizing it and recognizing that it is legitimate source of pleasure. The key is 
not to stop it but to enable people to control it." (Bennet & Savulescu 2006, p. 2) 
Helping people to control it could of course be to offer drug-vaccinations 
voluntarily, but also coercively in a criminal justice system where the drug 
themselves are not illegal. The justification could be that if people are unable to 
control their drug use in such a way that they end up getting convicted, they may be 
sentenced to lose ‘the right to get high’ for some time.  
One could also imagine combining the anti-drug vaccine with positive incentives 
outside of the criminal justice system. Offers such as: ‘Take the vaccine, and you can 
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spend time with your children’, or ‘Take the vaccine, and we will strike your debt’ or 
‘Take the vaccine, and we will buy you a new car’ may also be possible. 
I suspect that the main obstacles of such a scenario is actually the view of 
addiction which has not been discussed much in this thesis, the moral or lay view, 
which claims that addiction in itself is morally wrong. 
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